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Current public key cryptosystems that are based on the hardness of integer
factorization and discrete logarithm are insecure in the presence of large-scale quan-
tum computers. Much effort has been devoted to replacing the quantum-insecure
cryptosystems with newly developed “post-quantum” cryptosystem candidates, con-
jectured to be secure against quantum attack. Lattice-based cryptography has been
widely recognized as a prominent candidate for practical post-quantum security.
This dissertation improves the robustness and versatility of lattice-based cryp-
tography through the following three contributions:
1. Chapter 3 introduces a constant-round protocol for unauthenticated group
key exchange (i.e., with security against a passive eavesdropper). Group key-
exchange protocols allow a set of N parties to agree on a shared, secret key by
communicating over a public network. Our protocol is based on the hardness
of a lattice problem, which hence yields (plausible) post-quantum security.
2. In Chapter 4, we propose a framework for cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes
when certain types of information about the secret are leaked. Our framework
generalizes the primal lattice reduction attack. The generalization allows for
integrating the leaked information progressively before running a final lattice
reduction step. Our framework can estimate the amount of security loss caused
by the leaked information, and perform lattice reduction attacks with leaked
information when computationally feasible.
3. Chapter 5 introduces an approach towards a ring analogue of the Leftover
Hash Lemma (LHL). The LHL is a mathematical tool often used in the anal-
ysis of various lattice-based cryptosystems, as well as their leakage-resilient
counterparts. However, it does not hold in the ring setting, which is typi-
cal for efficient cryptosystems. Lyubashevsky et al. (Eurocrypt ’13) proved
a “regularity lemma,” which is used in the ring setting instead of the LHL;
however, this applies only for centered, spherical Gaussian inputs, while the
LHL applies when the input is drawn from any high min-entropy distribu-
tion. Our approach generalizes the “regularity lemma” of Lyubashevsky et al.
to certain conditional distributions. A number of Ring-Learning with Errors
based cryptosystems can achieve certain leakage resilience properties using our
results.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
As Shor’s algorithm solves integer factorization and discrete logarithm in poly-
nomial time [106], all public key cryptosystems that are based on hardness of integer
factorization and discrete logarithm are insecure in the presence of large-scale quan-
tum computers. Much effort has been made to replace standardized public key
cryptosystems, which are quantum-insecure, with newly developed post-quantum
cryptosystems, conjectured to be secure against quantum attack.
One promising candidate for practical, post-quantum cryptography are the
cryptosystems based on the hard lattice problems – lattice-based cryptography.
There are several lattice problems, which have been extensively studied for decades,
that are believed to be hard, even against a quantum computer; for example, short-
est vector problem (SVP), closest vector problem (CVP), etc. Cryptosystems have
been built from such problems, beginning from a seminal work by Ajtai [3]. One rel-
evant hard lattice problem to our work is the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem
introduced by Regev [103]. The (Decisional) LWE problem is defined as the problem
of distinguishing between the two distributions (A,As + e) and (A,u), where s is a
secret vector, matrix A and vector u are uniform, and vector e has a small norm.
LWE is proved to be as hard to solve as several worst-case standard lattice prob-
1
lems (e.g. [95,103]). To improve the efficiency of lattice-based cryptosystems, lattices
with additional algebraic structure were introduced [84,109]. Specifically, a ring ver-
sion of the LWE (Ring-LWE) problem is defined as the problem of distinguishing
(a, b = a · s + e) ∈ Rq × Rq from random pairs, where s ∈ Rq is a secret, a ∈ Rq is
uniform and the error term e ∈ R has a small norm, where Rq := Zq[x]/xn + 1.
Lattice-based cryptography has been recognized for its versatility in realizing
cryptographic applications. Hardness of lattice problems, especially LWE and Ring-
LWE, have been relied upon as security assumptions for key exchange (e.g. [9]), pub-
lic key encryption (e.g., [85]), digital signature (e.g., [56]), pseudorandom functions
(e.g., [12]), attribute-based encryption (e.g., [21]), fully homomorphic encryption
(e.g., [29]), non-interactive zero-knowledge [98], etc.
NIST has initiated a standardization process for quantum-resistant public-key
cryptographic algorithms. One concern that arises is the potential security loss in
the process of transitioning theoretical work with provable security into practice.
Although the best-known algorithms for solving the LWE problem run in exponen-
tial time, faulty parameter instantiation, incorrect implementation, or attacks on
implementation may lead to severe security risks, which is often not considered in
the scenarios of the original provable security claim. Such scenarios are referred
to as “imperfect” scenarios. Various efforts have been made to analyze security of
lattice schemes under “imperfect” scenarios (see [6, 64,97] for examples).
2
1.1 Our Contributions
This dissertation improves the robustness and versatility of lattice-based cryp-
tography through analyzing the security impact of potential information leakage on
lattice cryptosystems [44,47] and designing a lattice-based crypto application [10].
1.1.1 Lattice Cryptographic Protocol Construction
Group Key Exchange Protocol. In Chapter 3, we propose a constant-round
group key exchange protocol based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem.
Group key exchange is a protocol that allows a set of N parties to agree on a shared,
secret key by communicating over a public network. A number of solutions to this
problem have been proposed over the years, mostly based on variants of Diffie-
Hellman (two-party) key exchange. There has been relatively little work, however,
looking at candidate post-quantum group key-exchange protocols. Our protocol
is constructed by generalizing the Burmester-Desmedt protocol to the Ring-LWE
setting, which requires addressing several technical challenges.
This work was originally published in PQC 2019 [10], in collaboration with
Daniel Apon, Dana Dachman-Soled, and Jonathan Katz.
3
1.1.2 Security of Lattice-Based Cryptography under “Imperfect” Sce-
narios
Security of Learning with Errors with Side Information. In Chapter 4, we
propose a framework for the cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes for which certain
types of side information about the secret and/or error are available.
While there are many prior works addressing the concern of security impact
under “imperfect” scenarios for specific cryptosystems (See [6, 25] for side channel
attacks examples), these prior works use either ad-hoc statistical methods to re-
cover the secret key, requiring new techniques to be developed for each setting, or
require substantial amounts of information leakage to efficiently recover the secret.
As a general framework, our framework can estimate how much the leaked informa-
tion reduces the security level, with no requirement for the amount of information
leakage.
Our framework generalizes the primal lattice reduction attack and allows the
progressive integration of the side information before running a final lattice reduction
step. Our techniques for integrating side information include sparsifying the lattice,
projecting onto and intersecting with hyperplanes, and/or altering the distribution of
the secret vector. Our main contribution is to propose a toolbox and a methodology
to integrate such information into lattice reduction attacks and to predict the cost of
these lattice attacks with side information. In addition, we implement our framework
on Sage 9.0 and provide three examples that exploit side information leaked through
side-channel information, decryption failures, and constraints imposed by certain
4
schemes (LAC, Round5, NTRU).
This work was originally published in Crypto 2020 [44], in collaboration with
Dana Dachman-Soled, Léo Ducas, and Mélissa Rossi.
A Generalized Regularity Lemma over Ideal Lattice. In Chapter 5, we fo-
cus on proving a ring analogue of the leftover hash lemma (LHL). LHL is used in
the analysis of various integer lattice-based cryptosystems as well as their leakage-
resilient counterparts; however, it does not hold in the ring setting, which is typical
for efficient cryptosystems. Lyubashevsky et al. (Eurocrypt ’13) proved a “regular-
ity lemma,” which can be used instead of the LHL, but applies only for centered,
spherical Gaussian inputs, while LHL applies when the input is drawn from any high
min-entropy distribution. We present an approach for generalizing the “regularity
lemma” of Lyubashevsky et al. to certain conditional distributions.We assume the
input was sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution and consider the induced
distribution, given side-channel leakage on the input. We present three instanti-
ations of our approach, proving that the regularity lemma holds for three natural
conditional distributions. Since applications of the regularity lemma in lattice-based
cryptography are widespread, a number of Ring-LWE cryptosystems can achieve
certain leakage resilience properties using our results.
This work was originally published in MathCrypt 2019 [47], in collaboration




Let Z be the ring of integers, and let [N ] = {1, . . . , N} for a positive integer
N . If S is a set, then x1, x2, . . . , x` ← S denotes uniformly sampling each xi from S;
if χ is a probability distribution, then x1, x2, . . . , x` ← χ denotes independently
sampling each xi according to that distribution. Let χ(E) denote the probability
that event E occurs under distribution χ. We let Supp(χ) = {x : χ(x) 6= 0}. Given
an event E, we let E denote its complement. Given a polynomial pi, let (pi)j denote
the jth coefficient of pi. We use log(X) to denote log2(X), and exp(X) to denote e
X .
We let λ denote a computational security parameter, and ρ a statistical security
parameter.
We denote vectors in boldface x and matrices using capital letters A. For





. We write this
as ‖x‖ for simplicity.
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2.2 Probability and Statistics
2.2.1 Rényi divergence
For two discrete probability distributions P and Q with Supp(P ) ⊆ Supp(Q),







We use the following results (see [79,84,111] for proofs):
Theorem 2.1. For discrete distributions P and Q with Supp(P ) ⊆ Supp(Q) and
any f , we have
RD2(f(P )||f(Q)) ≤ RD2(P ||Q).
Theorem 2.2. For discrete distributions P and Q with Supp(P ) ⊆ Supp(Q), let
E ⊆ Supp(Q) be an arbitrary event. We have
Q(E) ≥ P (E)2/RD2(P ||Q).
The second property implies, roughly, that as long as RD2(P‖Q) is bounded
by some polynomial, then any event E that occurs with negligible probability Q(E)
under distribution Q also occurs with negligible probability P (E) under distribu-
tion P .
The following theorem bounds the Rényi divergence between the 1-dimensional
7
discrete Gaussian distribution centered at the origin and one centered at a point near
the origin.
Theorem 2.3 ( [17]). Fix m, q, λ ∈ Z, a bound βRényi, and σ with βRényi < σ < q.
Let e ∈ Z be such that |e| ≤ βRényi. Then
RD2((e+DZq ,σ)
m||DmZq ,σ) ≤ exp(2πm(βRényi/σ)
2).
(Here, χm denotes m independent samples from distribution χ.)
The above theorem implies that if σ = Ω(βRényi
√
m/ log λ) for some security
parameter λ, then RD2((e+DZq ,σ)
m||DmZq ,σ) = poly(λ).
2.2.2 Statistics
Random variables, i.e., variables whose values depend on outcomes of a random
phenomenon, are denoted in lowercase calligraphic letters, e.g., a, b, e. Random
vectors are denoted in uppercase calligraphic letters, e.g., C ,X ,Z.
Before hints are integrated, we will assume that the secret and error vectors
follow a multidimensional normal (Gaussian) distribution. Hints will typically cor-
respond to learning a (noisy, modular or perfect) linear equation on the secret. We
must then consider the altered distribution on the secret, conditioned on this infor-
mation. Fortunately, this will also be a multidimensional normal distribution with
an altered covariance and mean. In the following, we present the precise formulae
for the covariance and mean of these conditional distributions.
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Definition 2.4 (Multidimensional normal distribution). Let d ∈ Z, for µ ∈ Zd and
Σ being a symmetric matrix of dimension d×d, we denote by DdΣ,µ the multidimen-







(x− µ) ·Σ∼ · (x− µ)T
)
.
The following states how a normal distribution is altered under linear trans-
formation.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose X has a DdΣ,µ distribution. Let A be a n × d matrix. Then
X AT has a Dn
AΣAT ,µAT
distribution.
Lemma 2.6 shows the altered distribution of a normal random variable con-
ditioned on its noisy linear transformation value, following from [82, Equations (6)
and (7)].
Lemma 2.6 (Conditional distribution X |X AT + b from [82]). Suppose that X ∈ Zd
has a DdΣ,µ distribution, and b ∈ Zn has a DnΣb ,0 distribution. Let us fix A as
a n × d matrix and z ∈ Zn. The conditional distribution of X
∣∣∣ (X AT + b = z) is
DdΣ′,µ′, where
µ′ = µ + (z− µAT )(AΣAT + Σb)−1AΣ
Σ′ = Σ−ΣAT (AΣAT + Σb)−1AΣ.
Corollary 2.7 (Conditional distribution X |〈X ,v〉+ e). Suppose that X ∈ Zd has a
DdΣ,µ distribution and e has a D
1
σ2e ,0
distribution. Let us fix v ∈ Rd as a nonzero
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vector and z ∈ Z. We define the following scalars:
y = 〈X ,v〉+ e, µ2 = 〈v,µ〉 and σ2 = vΣvT + σ2e
If σ2 6= 0, the conditional distribution of X
∣∣∣ (y = z) is DdΣ′,µ′, where
µ′ = µ +
(z − µ2)
σ2




If σ2 = 0, the conditional distribution of X
∣∣∣ (y = z) is DdΣ,µ.
Remark 2.8. We note that Corollary 2.7 is also useful to describe for X |〈X ,v〉 by
letting σe = 0.
2.3 Lattice-based Cryptography
2.3.1 Lattice over Rm
A lattice, denoted as Λ, is a discrete additive subgroup of Rm, which is gener-
ated as the set of all linear integer combinations of n (m ≥ n) linearly independent




zjbj : zj ∈ Z
}
,
We say that m is the dimension of Λ and n is its rank. A lattice is full rank if
n = m. A matrix B having the basis vectors as rows is called a basis. The volume
of a lattice Λ is defined as Vol(Λ) :=
√
det(BBT ). The dual lattice of Λ in Rn is
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defined as follows.
Λ∗ := {y ∈ Span(B) | ∀x ∈ Λ, 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z}.
Note that, (Λ∗)∗ = Λ, and Vol(Λ∗) = 1/Vol(Λ).
Lemma 2.9 ( [87, Proposition 1.3.4]). Let Λ be a lattice and let F be a subspace of
Rn. If Λ∩F is a lattice, then the dual of Λ∩F is the orthogonal projection onto F
of the dual of Λ. In other words, each element of Λ∗ is multiplied by the projection
matrix ΠF :
(Λ ∩ F )∗ = Λ∗ ·ΠF .
Lemma 2.10 ( [87, Proposition 1.2.9]). Let Λ be a lattice in Rn, let F be a subspace
of Rn such that Λ∩ F is a lattice and let Π⊥F be the orthogonal projection onto F⊥.
Then
Vol(Λ ·Π⊥F ) = Vol(Λ)(Vol(Λ ∩ F )−1).
Definition 2.11 (Primitive vectors). A set of vectors y1, . . . ,yk ∈ Λ is said to be
primitive with respect to Λ if Λ ∩ Span(y1, . . . ,yk) is equal to the lattice generated
by y1, . . . ,yk. Equivalently, it is primitive if it can be extended to a basis of Λ. If
k = 1, this is equivalent to y1/i 6∈ Λ for any integer i ≥ 2.
2.3.2 Lattice over the space H
Let T = R/Z denote the cycle, i.e. the additive group of reals modulo 1.
We also denote by Tq its cyclic subgroup of order q, i.e., the subgroup given by
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{0, 1/q, . . . , (q − 1)/q}.
Let H be a subspace, defined as H ⊆ CZ∗m , (for some integer m ≥ 2),
H = {x ∈ CZ∗m : xi = xm−i, ∀i ∈ Z∗m}.
A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of H. We exclusively consider the
full-rank lattices, which are generated as the set of all linear integer combinations
of some set of n linearly independent basis vectors B = {bj} ⊂ H:
Λ = L(B) =
{∑
j
zjbj : zj ∈ Z
}
.
The determinant of a lattice L(B) is defined as |det(B)|, which is independent of
the choice of basis B. The minimum distance λ1(Λ) of a lattice Λ (in the Euclidean
norm) is the length of a shortest nonzero lattice vector.
The dual lattice of Λ ⊂ H is defined as following, where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner
product.




Note that, (Λ∨)∨ = Λ, and det(Λ∨) = 1/det(Λ).
2.3.2.1 Discretization
Discretization is an important procedure used in applications based on lattices,
such as converting continuous Gaussian distribution (defined in Appendix 2.4.2)
into a discrete Gaussian distribution (Definition 2.29). Given a lattice Λ = L(B)
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represented by some “good” basis B = {bi}, a point x ∈ H, and a point c ∈ H
representing a lattice coset Λ+c, the discretization process outputs a point y ∈ Λ+c
such that the length of y − x is not too large. This is denoted as y ← bxeΛ+c. A
discretization procedure is called valid if it is efficient; and depends only on the
lattice coset Λ + (c − x), not on particular representative used to specify it. Note
that for a valid discretization, bz + xeΛ+c and z + bxeΛ+c are identically distributed
for any z ∈ Λ. For more details and actual description of algorithms used for
discretization we refer the interested reader to [85].
2.3.3 Algebraic Number Theory
For a positive integer m, the mth cyclotomic number field is a field extension
K = Q(ζm) obtained by adjoining an element ζm of order m (i.e., a primitive mth






(X − ωim) ∈ Z[X],
where ωm ∈ C is any primitive mth root of unity in C.
For every i ∈ Z∗m, there is an embedding σi : K → C, defined as σi(ζm) = ωim.
Let n = ϕ(m), the totient of m. The trace Tr : K → Q and norm N : K → Q can









For any x ∈ K, the lp norm of x is defined as ‖x‖p = ‖σ(x)‖p = (
∑
i∈[n] |σi(x)|p)1/p.
We omit p when p = 2. Note that the appropriate notion of norm ‖·‖ is used
throughout this paper depending on whether the argument is a vector over Cn, or
whether the argument is an element from K; whenever the context is clear.
2.3.3.1 Ring of Integers and Its Ideals
Let R ⊂ K denote the set of all algebraic integers in a number field K. This set
forms a ring (under the usual addition and multiplication operations in K), called
the ring of integers of K. The ring of integers in K is written as R = Z[ζm].
The (absolute) discriminant ∆K of K measures the geometric sparsity of its








in which the product in the denominator runs over all the primes dividing m.
An (integral) ideal I ⊆ R is a non-trivial (i.e. I 6= ∅ and I 6= {0}) additive
subgroup that is closed under multiplication by R, i,e., r · a ∈ I for any r ∈ R
and a ∈ I. The norm of an ideal I ⊆ R is the number of cosets of I as an
addictive subgroup in R, defined as index of I, i.e., N(I) = |R/I|. Note that
N(IJ ) = N(I)N(J ).
A fractional ideal I in K is defined as a subset such that I ⊆ R is an integral
ideal for some nonzero d ∈ R. Its norm is defined as N(I) = N(dI)/N(d). An
ideal lattice is a lattice σ(I) embedded from a fractional ideal I by σ in H. The
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determinant of an ideal lattice σ(I) is det(σ(I)) = N(I) ·
√
∆K . For simplicity,
however, most often when discussing about ideal lattice, we omit mention of σ since
no confusion is likely to arise.
Lemma 2.12 ( [85]). For any fractional ideal I in a number field K of degree n,
√
n · N1/n(I) ≤ λ1(I) ≤
√





For any fractional ideal I in K, its dual ideal is defined as
I∨ = {a ∈ K : Tr(aI) ⊂ Z}.
Definition 2.13. For R = Z[ζm], define g =
∏
p(1 − ζp) ∈ R, where p runs over
all odd primes dividing m. Also, define t = m̂
g
∈ R, where m̂ = m
2
if m is even,
otherwise m̂ = m.
The dual ideal R∨ of R is defined as R∨ = 〈t−1〉, satisfying R ⊆ R∨ ⊆ m̂−1R.
For any fractional ideal I, its dual is I∨ = I−1 · R∨. The quotient R∨q is defined as
R∨q = R
∨/qR∨.
Fact 2.14 ( [85]). Assume that q is a prime satisfying q = 1 mod m, so that 〈q〉
splits completely into n distinct ideals of norm q. The prime ideal factors of 〈q〉 are




(R/qi) ∼= (Znq ) is an isomorphism.
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2.3.4 Ring Learning with Errors
Informally, the (decisional) version of the Ring Learning with Errors (Ring-
LWE) problem is: for some secret ring element s, distinguish many random “noisy
ring products” with s from elements drawn uniformly from the ring. More precisely,
the Ring-LWE problem is parameterized by (R, q, χ, `) where:
1. R = Z[X]/(f(X)) is a ring, where f(X) is an irreducible polynomial f(X) in
the indeterminate X. In this paper, we restrict to the case of f(X) = Xn + 1,
where n is a power of 2.
2. q is a modulus defining the quotient ring Rq := R/qR = Zq[X]/(f(X)). We
restrict to the case where q is prime with q = 1 mod 2n.
3. χ = (χs, χe) is a pair of noise distributions over Rq (with χs the secret-key
distribution and χe the error distribution) that are concentrated on “short”
elements, for an appropriate definition of “short.”
4. ` is the number of samples provided to the adversary.
Formally, the Ring-LWE problem is to distinguish between ` samples inde-
pendently drawn from one of two distributions. In the first case, the samples are
generated by choosing s← χs and then outputting
(ai, bi = s · ai + ei) ∈ Rq ×Rq
for i ∈ [`], where each ai is uniform in Rq and each ei ← χe is drawn from the
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error distribution χe. In the second case, each sample (ai, bi) is uniformly and
independently drawn from Rq×Rq. We let AdvRLWEn,q,χs,χe,`(B) denote the advantage of
algorithm B in distinguishing these two cases, and define AdvRLWEn,q,χs,χe,`(t) to be the
maximum advantage of any algorithm running in time t. If χ = χs = χe, we write
Advn,q,χ,` for simplicity.
The noise distribution. The noise distribution χ = χs = χe is usually a discrete
Gaussian distribution on Rq. For power-of-2 cyclotomic rings of the form we con-
sider here, it is possible to sample a polynomial from this distribution by drawing
each coefficient of the polynomial independently from the 1-dimensional discrete
Gaussian distribution over Zq with parameter σ. This distribution, supported on









2.3.4.1 Formal Definitions of Ring-LWE in LPR13 [85]
Lemma 2.15. [85, Lemma 2.23] Let p and q be positive coprime integers, and b·e
be a valid discretization to (cosets of) pR∨. There exists an efficient transformation
that on input w ∈ R∨p and a pair in (a′, b′) ∈ Rq × (KR/qR∨), outputs a pair (a =
pa′mod qR, b) ∈ Rq×R∨q with the following guarantees: if the input pair is uniformly
distributed then so is the output pair; and if the input pair is distributed according
to the RLWE distribution As,ψ for some (unknown) s ∈ R∨ and distribution ψ over
KR, then the output pair is distributed according to As,χ, where χ = bp · ψew+pR∨.
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Lemma 2.16. [85, Lemma 2.24] Let p and q be positive coprime integers, b·e be
a valid discretization to (cosets of) pR∨, and w be an arbitrary element in R∨p . If
R-DLWEq,ψ is hard given l samples, then so is the variant of R-DLWEq,ψ in which
the secret is sampled from χ := bp · ψew+pR∨, given l − 1 samples.
2.4 The Remaining Mathematical Background
2.4.1 Linear Algebra
We use bold lower case letters to denote vectors, and bold upper case letters
to denote matrices. We use row notations for vectors, and start indexing from 0.
Let Id denote the d-dimensional identity matrix. Let 〈·, ·〉 denote the inner product
of two vectors of the same size. Let us introduce the row span of a matrix (denoted
Span(·)) as the subspace generated by all R-linear combinations of the rows of its
input.
Definition 2.17 (Positive Semidefinite). A n× n symmetric real matrix M is pos-
itive semidefinite if scalar xMxT ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Rn; if so we write M ≥ 0. Given
two n× n real matrix A and B, we note A ≥ B if A−B is positive semidefinite.
Definition 2.18. A matrix M is a square root of Σ, denoted
√
Σ, if
MT ·M = Σ,
Our techniques involve keeping track of the covariance matrix Σ of the secret
and error vectors as hints are progressively integrated. The covariance matrix may
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become singular during this process and will not have an inverse. Therefore, in the
following we introduce some degenerate notions for the inverse and the determinant
of a square matrix. Essentially, we restrict these notions to the row span of their in-
put. For X ∈ Rd×k (with any d, k ∈ N), we will denote ΠX the orthogonal projection
matrix onto Span(X). More formally, let Y be a maximal set of independent row-
vectors of X; the orthogonal projection matrix is given by ΠX = Y
T ·(Y ·YT )−1 ·Y.
Its complement (the projection orthogonally to Span(X)) is denoted Π⊥X := Id−ΠX.
We naturally extend the notation ΠF and Π
⊥
F to subspaces F ⊂ Rd. By definition,
the projection matrices satisfy Π2F = ΠF , Π
T
F = ΠF and ΠF ·Π⊥F = Π⊥F ·ΠF = 0.
Definition 2.19 (Restricted inverse and determinant). Let Σ be a symmetric ma-
trix. We define a restricted inverse denoted Σ∼ as
Σ∼ := (Σ + Π⊥Σ)
−1 −Π⊥Σ.
It satisfies Span(Σ∼) = Span(Σ) and Σ ·Σ∼ = ΠΣ.
We also denote rdet(Σ) as the restricted determinant defined as follows.
rdet(Σ) := det(Σ + Π⊥Σ).
The idea behind Definition 2.19 is to provide an (artificial) invertibility prop-
erty to the input Σ by adding the missing orthogonal part and to remove it after-
wards. For example, if Σ =
A 0
0 0


















 and rdet Σ = det(A).
Fact 2.20 (Lattice volume under linear transformations). Let Λ be a lattice in Rn,
and M ∈ Rn×n a matrix such that ker M = Span(Λ)⊥. Then we have Vol(Λ ·M) =
rdet(M) Vol(Λ).
2.4.2 Regularity and Fourier Transforms
Let ρs,c denote an n-dimensional Gaussian function with parameter s and mean
c.
One and Multi-Dimensional Gaussians. For s > 0, c ∈ R, x ∈ R, define the








By normalizing this function we obtain the continuous Gaussian probability distri-
bution ψ1s,c (resp. ψ
1
s) of parameter s, whose density is given by s
−1 · ρ1s,c(x) (resp.
s−1 · ρ1s(x)).
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We denote by ρ(s1,...,sn),(c1,...,cn) the distribution over Rn with the following pdf:
Let ρ1s,c denote a one-dimensional Gaussian function as above with standard
deviation s and mean c.We denote by ρ(s1,...,sn),(c1,...,cn) the distribution over Rn with
the following pdf:
ρ(s1,...,sn),(c1,...,cn)(x1, . . . , xn) := ρ
1
s1,c1
(x1) · · · ρ1sn,cn(xn).
When c = 0, we again write for simplicity, ρ(s1,...,sn). Moreover, when s1 = · · · = sn
and the dimension is clear from context we write for simplicity ρs,(c1,...,cn) (resp. ρs).
Normalizing as above, we obtain the corresponding continuous Gaussian probability
distribution ψ(s1,...,sn),(c1,...,cn) (resp. ψ(s1,...,sn), ψs,(c1,...,cn), ψs).
Definition 2.21 (Fourier Transform). Given an integrable function f : Rn → C,





Theorem 2.22 (Poisson Summation Formula). Let Λ ⊂ Rn be an arbitrary lattice





where Λ∨ is the dual lattice of Λ and f̂ is a Fourier transform of f .
1Assume that (1).
∫
Rn |f(x)|dx < ∞ . (2). Function f(Λ + u) is continuous on R
n. (3). The
series f̂(Λ∨) is absolutely convergent. (See [59] for details)
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Definition 2.23. For an n-dimensional lattice Λ, and positive real ε > 0, we define
its smoothing parameter ηε(Λ) to be the smallest s such that ρ1/s(Λ
∨ \ {0}) ≤ ε.









, for ε ∈ [2−n, 1].










Lemma 2.26. For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and ε > 0, s := (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn>0,











Proof. Applying Poisson summation formula twice, using the fact that for all vectors
x ∈ Rn, ρ̂(1/s1,...,1/sn),(c1,...,cn)(x) ≤ (s1)−1 · · · (sn)−1 · ρ(s1,...,sn)(x), and the fact that
ρ̂ηε(Λ∨) = ηε(Λ
∨)n · ρ1/ηε(Λ∨), we have:
ρ(1/s1,...,1/sn),(c1,...,cn)(Λ) ≤ det(Λ)−1(s1)−1 · · · (sn)−1 · ρ(s1,...,sn)(Λ∨)
≤ det(Λ)−1(s1)−1 · · · (sn)−1 · ρηε(Λ∨)(Λ∨)
= (s1)











where the last inequality follows from the definition of ηε(Λ
∨).
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Lemma 2.27. [91, Lemma 3.6] For any lattice Λ, positive real s > 0 and a vector
c, ρs,c(Λ) ≤ ρs(Λ).
Definition 2.28. Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice and Ψ a probability distribution





Definition 2.29. Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice, define the discrete Gaussian





Remark 2.30. Whenever Ψ is Gaussian with parameter (s1, . . . , sn) and center
(c1, . . . , cn) we denote it’s discrete Gaussian probability by DΛ,(s1,··· ,sn),(c1,...,cn). If s =
s1 = · · · = sn (resp. c = c1 = · · · = cn) we write DΛ,s,(c1,...,cn) (resp. DΛ,(s1,...,sn),c).
If c1 = · · · = cn = 0 we write DΛ,(s1,··· ,sn).
Lemma 2.31. [91, Lemma 4.4] For any n′-dimensional lattice Λ, and reals 0 <








≤ 1 + ε
1− ε
· 2−n′ .
The following is a modified version of Lemma 3.8 from [103].
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Lemma 2.32. Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice and Ψ a probability distribution
over Rn. If |Ψ̂|(Λ∨ \ {0}) ≤ ε, then for any c ∈ Rn, Ψ(Λ + c) ∈ det(Λ∨)(1 ± ε),
where |Ψ̂|(Λ∨ \ {0}) denotes the summation of the absolute value of the function at
each point in Λ∨ \ {0}.
Proof. First, since Ψ is a pdf, we have that Ψ̂(0) = 1. We have:















where the equality follows from properties of the Fourier transform.
The proof of the following lemma proceeds as the proof of Corollary 2.8 in [63].
Lemma 2.33. Let Λ′ be an n-dimensional lattice and Ψ a probability distribution
over Rn. Assume that for all c ∈ Rn it is the case that









Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice such that Λ′ ⊆ Λ then the distribution of (DΛ,Ψ
mod Λ′) is within statistical distance of at most 4ε of uniform over (Λ mod Λ′).
Definition 2.34. For a matrix A ∈ Rk×lq we define Λ⊥(A) = {z ∈ Rl : Az =
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0 mod qR}, which we identify with a lattice in H l. Its dual lattice (which is again a
lattice in H l) is denoted by Λ⊥(A)∨.
Theorem 2.35. [85] Let R be the ring of integers in the mth cyclotomic number
field K of degree n, and q ≥ 2 an integer. For positive integers k ≤ l ≤ poly(n), let
A = [Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l, where Ik ∈ (Rq)k×k is the identity matrix and Ā ∈ (Rq)k×(l−k)







≤ 1 + 2(s/n)−nlqkn+2 + 2−Ω(n).






≤ 1 + 2−Ω(n), and so by
Markov’s inequality, η2−Ω(n)(Λ
⊥(A)) ≤ s except with probability at most 2−Ω(n).
The following corollary was presented in [85].
Corollary 2.36. Let R, n, q, k and l be as in Theorem 2.35. Assume that A =
[Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l is chosen as in Theorem 2.35. Then, with probability 1 − 2−Ω(n)
over the choice of Ā, the distribution of Ax ∈ Rkq , where each coordinate of x ∈ Rlq
is chosen from a discrete Gaussian distribution of parameter s > 2n · qk/l+2/(nl) over
R, satisfies that the probability of each of the qnk possible outcomes is in the interval
(1±2−Ω(n))q−nk (and in particular is within statistical distance 2−Ω(n) of the uniform
distribution over Rkq ).
We next state an additional corollary of the regularity theorem from [85].
Corollary 2.37. Let R, n, q, k and l be as in Theorem 2.35. Assume that A =
[Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l is chosen as in Theorem 2.35. Then, with probability 1 − 2−Ω(n)
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Chapter 3: Constant-Round Group Key Exchange
Protocols for (authenticated) key exchange are among the most fundamental
and widely used cryptographic primitives. They allow parties communicating over
an insecure public network to establish a common secret key, called a session key,
permitting the subsequent use of symmetric-key cryptography for encryption and
authentication of sensitive data. They can be used to instantiate so-called “secure
channels” upon which higher-level cryptographic protocols often depend.
Most work on key exchange, beginning with the classical paper of Diffie and
Hellman, has focused on two-party key exchange. However, many works have also
explored extensions to the group setting [1, 2, 13, 14, 18, 19, 30–33, 35, 36, 41, 71, 73,
76,78,107,110,113] in which N parties wish to agree on a common session key that
they can each then use for encrypted communication with the rest of the group.
The recent effort by NIST to evaluate and standardize one or more quantum-
resistant public-key cryptosystems is entirely focused on digital signatures and two-
party key encapsulation/key exchange,1 and there has been an extensive amount of
research over the past decade focused on designing such schemes. In contrast, we
are aware of almost no2 work on group key-exchange protocols with post-quantum
1Note that CPA-secure key encapsulation is equivalent to two-round key-exchange (with passive
security).
2Exceptions include the work of Ding et al. [52], which lacks a proof of security; the work of
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security beyond the observation that a post-quantum group key-exchange protocol
can be constructed from any post-quantum two-party protocol by having a desig-
nated group manager run independent two-party protocols with the N − 1 other
parties, and then send a session key of its choice to the other parties encrypted/au-
thenticated using each of the resulting keys. Such a solution is often considered
unacceptable since it is highly asymmetric, requires additional coordination, is not
contributory, and puts a heavy load on a single party who becomes a central point
of failure.
3.1 Our High-Level Approach
In this work, we propose a constant-round group key-exchange protocol based
on the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem [84], and hence with (plausible) post-
quantum security. In this work, we focus on constructing an unauthenticated protocol—
i.e., one secure against a passive eavesdropper—since known techniques such as the
Katz-Yung compiler [75] can then be applied to obtain an authenticated protocol
secure against an active attacker.
The starting point for our work is the two-round group key-exchange protocol
by Burmester and Desmedt [35, 36, 76], which is based on the decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption. Assume a group G of prime order q and a generator g ∈ G
are fixed and public. The Burmester-Desmedt protocol run by parties P0, . . . , PN−1
then works as follows:
Boneh et al. [22] shows a framework for group key-exchange protocols with plausible post-quantum
security but without a concrete instantiation.
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1. In the first round, each party Pi chooses uniform ri ∈ Zq and broadcasts
zi = g
ri to all other parties.
2. In the second round, each party Pi broadcasts Xi = (zi+1/zi−1)
ri (where the
parties’ indices are taken modulo N).
Each party Pi can then compute its session key ski as
ski = (zi−1)
Nri ·XN−1i ·XN−2i+1 · · ·Xi+N−2.
One can check that all the keys are equal to the same value gr0r1+···+rN−1r0 .
In attempting to adapt their protocol to the Ring-LWE setting, we could fix
a public ring Rq and a uniform element a ∈ Rq. Then:
1. In the first round, each party Pi chooses “small” secret value si ∈ Rq and
“small” noise term ei ∈ Rq (with the exact distribution being unimportant in
the present discussion), and broadcasts zi = asi + ei to the other parties.
2. In the second round, each party Pi chooses a second “small” noise term e
′
i ∈ Rq
and broadcasts Xi = (zi+1 − zi−i) · si + e′i.
Each party can then compute a session key bi as
bi = N · si · zi−1 + (N − 1) ·Xi + (N − 2) ·Xi+1 + · · ·+Xi+N−2.
The problem, of course, is that (due to the noise terms) these session keys computed
by the parties will not be equal. They will, however, be “close” to each other if the
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{si, ei, e′i} are all sufficiently small, so we can add an additional reconciliation step
to ensure that all parties agree on a common key k.
This gives a protocol that is correct, but proving security (even for a passive
eavesdropper) is more difficult than in the case of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol.
Here we informally outline the main difficulties and how we address them. First, we
note that trying to prove security by direct analogy to the proof of security for the
Burmester-Desmedt protocol (cf. [75]) fails; in the latter case, it is possible to use
the fact that, for example,
(z2/z0)
r1 = zr2−r01 ,
whereas in our setting the analogous relation does not hold. In general, the natural
proof strategy here is to switch all the {zi} values to uniform elements of Rq, and
similarly to switch the {Xi} values to uniform subject to the constraint that their
sum is approximately 0 (i.e., subject to the constraint that
∑
iXi ≈ 0). Unfor-
tunately this cannot be done by simply invoking the Ring-LWE assumption O(N)
times; in particular, the first time we try to invoke the assumption, say on the pair
(z1 = as1 + e1, X1 = (z2 − z0) · s1 + e′1), we need z2 − z0 to be uniform—which, in
contrast to the analogous requirement in the Burmester-Desmedt protocol (for the
value z2/z0), is not the case here. Thus, we must somehow break the circularity in
the mutual dependence of the {zi, Xi} values.












Consider now changing the way X0 is chosen: that is, instead of choosing X0 =







from the same distribution as before). Intuitively, as long as the standard deviation
of e′0 is large enough, these two distributions of X0 should be “close” (as they both
satisfy
∑
iXi ≈ 0). This, in particular, means that we need the distribution of e′0
to be different from the distribution of the {e′i}i>0, as the standard deviation of the
former needs to be larger than the latter.
We can indeed show that when we choose e′0 from an appropriate distribution
then the Rényi divergence between the two distributions of X0, above, is bounded
by a polynomial. With this switch in the distribution of X0, we have broken the
circularity and can now use the Ring-LWE assumption to switch the distribution of
z0 to uniform, followed by the remaining {zi, Xi} values.
Unfortunately, bounded Rényi divergence does not imply statistical closeness.
However, polynomially bounded Rényi divergence does imply that any event oc-
curring with negligible probability when X0 is chosen according to the second dis-
tribution also occurs with negligible probability when X0 is chosen according to
the first distribution. For these reasons, we change our security goal from an
“indistinguishability-based” one (namely, requiring that the real session key k is
indistinguishable from uniform) to an “unpredictability-based” one (namely, requir-
ing that it is infeasible for an attacker to compute the real session key k). In the
end, though, once the parties agree on an unpredictable value k they can hash it to
obtain the final session key sk = H(k); this final value sk will be indistinguishable
from uniform if H is modeled as a random oracle.
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3.2 Security Model
A group key-exchange protocol allows a session key to be established among
N > 2 parties. Following prior work [31–33, 75], we will use the term group key
exchange (GKE) to denote a protocol secure against a passive (eavesdropping) ad-
versary, and use the term authenticated group key exchange (GAKE) to denote a
protocol secure against an active adversary who controls all communication chan-
nels. Fortunately, the work of Katz and Yung [75] presents a compiler that takes
any GKE protocol and transforms it into a GAKE protocol. The underlying tool
required for this transform is any secure signature scheme; if post-quantum security
is needed, then any post-quantum signature scheme can be used. We thus focus our
attention on achieving GKE in the remainder of this work.
In the security definition for group key exchange, the adversary observes a
single transcript generated by an execution of the protocol. The adversary’s goal
is then to distinguish the real session key generated in that execution of the pro-
tocol from a key that is generated uniformly and independently of that transcript.
Formally, given a GKE protocol Π we let ExecuteΠ(λ) denote an execution of the
protocol (on security parameter λ), resulting in a transcript trans of all messages
sent during the course of that execution, along with the session key sk computed
by the parties. Protocol Π is secure if the following distribution ensembles are
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computationally indistinguishable:
{(trans, sk)← ExecuteΠ(1λ) : (trans, sk)}1λ∈N,
{(trans, sk)← ExecuteΠ(1λ), sk′ ← {0, 1}1
λ
: (trans, sk′)}1λ∈N.
Our protocol Π will be analyzed in the random-oracle model. In this case, fixing
some λ, we let AdvGKEΠ (A) denote the advantage of an adversary A in distinguish-
ing between the distributions above, and define AdvGKEΠ (t, q) to be the maximum
advantage of any adversary running in time t and making at most q queries to the
random oracle.
3.3 Group Key Exchange Protocol
In this section, we present a group key exchange protocol Π for N parties
P0, . . . , PN−1. Our protocol relies on a key-reconciliation mechanism KeyRec (pa-
rameterized by a bound βRec) as a subroutine.
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3.3.1 Generic Key Reconciliation
In this subsection, we define a generic, one round, two-party key reconciliation
mechanism (tailored to the Ring-LWE setting) that allows two parties to derive a
shared key if they begin holding “close” ring elements. Formally, a key-reconciliation
mechanism KeyRec consists of two algorithms recMsg and recKey, parameterized by
a bound βRec (that may depend on the security parameter). The first algorithm takes
as input the security parameter 1λ and a value b ∈ Rq, and outputs a reconciliation
message rec and a key k ∈ {0, 1}λ. The second algorithm takes as input 1λ, a value
b′ ∈ Rq, and rec, and outputs k′ ∈ {0, 1}λ.
Correctness requires that whenever b, b′ are “close,” then k′ = k. Specifically,
for any b, b′ for which each coefficient of b−b′ is bounded by βRec, if we run (rec, k)←
recMsg(1λ, b) followed by k′ := recKey(1λ, b′, rec) then k = k′.
Security requires that if b is uniform and we derive (rec, k) ← recMsg(1λ, b),
then k is computationally indistingiushable from uniform even for an attacker given rec.
Formally, the following two distribution ensembles must be computationally indis-
tinguishable:
{
b← Rq; (rec, k)← recMsg(1λ, b) : (rec, k)
}
λ∈N ,{
b← Rq; (rec, k)← recMsg(1λ, b); k′ ← {0, 1}λ : (rec, k′)
}
λ∈N ,
For some fixed value of λ we denote by AdvKeyRec(B) the advantage of adversary B in
distinguishing these distributions, and let AdvKeyRec(t) be the maximum advantage
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of any such adversary running in time t.
Key-reconciliation mechanisms from the literature. The notion of key rec-
onciliation was first introduced by Ding et al. [52], and was later used in several
works on two-party key exchange [9, 96, 115]. In the key reconciliation mechanisms
of Peikert [96], Zhang et al. [115] and Alkim et al. [9], the agreed-upon key k = k′ is
close to each of the original values b, b′ held by the parties. When instantiating our
group key exchange (GKE) protocol with this type of key-reconciliation mechanism,
our final GKE protocol is contributory. In other cases [8], the agreed-upon key is
determined by the randomness used when running recMsg; instantiating our GKE




The overall structure of the protocol is as follows. The first two rounds allow
the parties to agree on “close” keys b0 ≈ · · · ≈ bN−1. Player N −1 then initiates the
key-reconciliation mechanism to allow all parties to agree on the same key k = k0 =
· · · = kN−1 ∈ {0, 1}λ. Since we are only able to prove that k is difficult to compute
for an eavesdropping adversary (but may not be indistinguishable from random),
we then have each party hash k (using a hash function H) to obtain the final shared
key sk.
Our protocol is parameterized by noise distributions χσ1 , χσ2 , and assumes
public parameters Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1) along with a uniform value a ∈ Rq. The
protocol proceeds as follows:
Round 1: Each player Pi samples si, ei ← χσ1 and broadcasts zi = asi + ei.
Round 2: Player P0 samples e
′
0 ← χσ2 and each of the other players Pi samples
e′i ← χσ1 . Each Pi broadcasts Xi = (zi+1 − zi−1)si + e′i.
Round 3: Player PN−1 samples e
′′
N−1 ← χσ1 and computes
bN−1 = zN−2NsN−1 + (N − 1) ·XN−1 + (N − 2) ·X0 + · · ·+XN−3 + e′′N−1.
It then computes (rec, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1) and broadcasts rec. Finally, it
outputs the session key skN−1 = H(kN−1).
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Key computation: Each player Pi (except PN−1) computes
bi = zi−1Nsi + (N − 1) ·Xi + (N − 2) ·Xi+1 + · · ·+Xi+N−2.
It then sets ki = recKey(bi, rec), and outputs the session key ski = H(ki).
The following shows a condition under which each party derives the same
session key with all but negligible probability.
Theorem 3.1. Fix ρ, and assume
(N2 + 2N) ·
√
n ρ3/2 σ21 + (
N2
2
+ 1) · σ1 + (N − 2) · σ2 ≤ βRec.
Then all parties output the same key except with probability at most 2−ρ+1.
Proof. We begin by introducing the following lemmas to analyze probabilities that






0 are “short” for all i, and conditioned on the first
event, siei is “short”.






0 for all i as defined in the group key exchange




, and let boundρ denote the event that for all i and all
coordinate indices j, |(e′0)j| ≤ cσ2 and |(si)j|, |(ei)j|, |(e′′N−1)j| ≤ cσ1, and that for
all i > 0 and all j it holds that |(e′i)j| ≤ cσ1, we have
Pr[boundρ] ≥ 1− 2−ρ.
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dt ≤ e−x2 , we obtain






















Note that there are 3nN coordinates sampled from distribution DZq ,σ1 , and n co-
ordinates sampled from distribution DZq ,σ2 in total. Under the assumption that








1− Pr[|e′0| ≥ cσ2 + 1; e′0 ← DZq ,σ2 ]
)n
≥ 1− (3nN + n)e−c2π ≥ 1− e−c2π/2 ≥ 1− 2−ρ.
Lemma 3.3. Given boundρ as defined in Lemma 3.2, let productsi,ej denote the event
that, for all v, |(siej)v| ≤
√
nρ3/2σ21,
Pr[productsi,ej | boundρ] ≥ 1− 2n · 2−2ρ.




i. (ej)t is defined analogously. Since we have X
n + 1 as modulo of
R, it is easy to see that (siej)v = cvX








v−u = (ej)v−u. (ej)
∗
v−u = −(ej)v−u+n otherwise. Thus, conditioned on |(si)t| ≤




, by Hoeffding’s Inequality [68],
we derive
















as each product (si)u(ej)
∗
v−u in the sum is an independent random variable with





nρ3/2σ21 | boundρ] ≤ 2−2ρ+1. (3.1)
Finally, via a union bound, we thus have
Pr[productsi,ej|boundρ] = Pr[∀v : |(siej)v| ≤
√
nρ3/2σ21] ≥ 1− 2n · 2−2ρ. (3.2)
Now we begin analyzing the chance that not all parties agree on the same final
key. The correctness of KeyRec guarantees that this group key exchange protocol
has agreed session key among all parties. Formally, if for all i and j that the jth
coefficient of |bN−1 − bi| ≤ βRec, then for all i, ki = kN−1.
For better illustration, we first write X0, . . . , XN−1 in form of linear system as
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follows. X = [X0 X1 X2 · · · XN−1]T
=

1 0 0 0 . . . 0 −1
−1 1 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 −1 1 0 . . . 0 0























s0e1 − s0eN−1 + e′0
s1e2 − s1e0 + e′1
s2e3 − s2e1 + e′2
s3e4 − s3e2 + e′3
...
sN−2eN−3 − sN−2eN−3 + e′N−2






We denote the matrices above by M,S,E from left to right and have the linear
system as X = MS + E. Let Bi = [i − 1 i − 2 · · · 0 N − 1 N − 2 · · · i]
as a N-dimensional row vector. We can then write bi as Bi · X + N(asisi−1 +
siei−1) = BiMS + BiE + N(asisi−1 + siei−1) for i 6= N − 1 and write bN−1 as
BN−1MS+BN−1E+N(asN−1sN−2 +sN−1eN−2)+e
′′
N−1. It is straightforward to see
that, entries of MS and Nasisi−1 are eliminated through the process of computing
bN−1 − bi. Thus we obtain
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bN−1 − bi = (BN−1 −Bi) E +N(sN−1eN−2 − siei−1) + e′′N−1










sjej+1 − sjej−1 + e′j
)
+N(sN−1eN−2 − siei−1)
Observe that for an arbitrary i ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}, and in any coordinate of the sum
above, there are at most (N2 + 2N) terms in form of suev, at most N
2/2 terms in
form of e′w sampled from χσ1 , at most N − 2 terms of e′0 sampled from χσ2 , and one
term of e′′N−1.
Let productALL denote the event that for all the terms in form of suev observed
above, each coefficient of such term is bounded by
√
nρ3/2σ21. Under that assumption
that assuming 2n(N2 + 2N) ≤ 2ρ (which holds for all reasonable settings of the
parameters) and using a union bound, it is straightforward to see
Pr[productALL|boundρ] ≤ (N2 + 2N) · 2n2−2ρ ≤ 2−ρ.
Let fail be the event that not all parties agree on the same final key. Given





+ 1)σ1 + (N − 2)σ2 ≤ βRec satisfied, we
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have
Pr[fail] = Pr[fail|boundρ] · Pr[boundρ] + Pr[fail|boundρ] · Pr[boundρ] (3.4)
≤ Pr[productALL] · 1 + 1 · Pr[boundρ] ≤ 2 · 2−ρ, (3.5)
which completes the proof.
3.4 Proof of Security
Here we prove security of our protocol Π. We remark that our proof considers
only a classical attacker; in particular, we only allow the attacker classical access
to H. We leave proving the protocol can be proven secure even against attackers
that are allowed to make quantum queries to H to future work.
Theorem 3.4. Assume 2N
√
nλ3/2 σ21 + (N − 1) · σ1 ≤ βRényi and βRényi < σ2 < q,
and model H as a random oracle. Then
AdvGKEΠ (t, q) ≤ 2−λ+1
+
√(











where t1 = t+O(N ·tring), t2 = t+O(N ·tring) and tring is the time required to perform
operations in Rq.
Proof. Let Expt0 refer to the experiment in which protocol Π is executed to obtain
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output (T, sk), where T = ({zi}, {Xi}, hint) is the transcript of the execution and
sk is the final shared session key (more formally, the session key output by PN−1).
We also then provide the attacker A with (T, sk), and then allow A to interact with
the random oracle used when executing Π. Our goal is to bound the advantage of
an attacker in distinguishing between samples (T, sk) distributed according to Expt0
and samples (T, sk′) in which T is distributed the same way but sk′ is a uniform key
(chosen independently of T). To do so, we show that the probability that A queries
kN−1 to the random oracle (which we denote by the event Query) is small; since that
is the only way an attacker can distinguish sk = H(kN−1) from an independent,
uniform value, that allows us to prove our desired result. In proving our result, we
consider a sequence of experiments, and let Pri[·] denote the probability of an event
in Experiment i.




a← Rq; ∀i : si, ei ← χσ1 ; zi = asi + ei;
e′1, . . . , e
′
N−1 ← χσ1 ; e′0 ← χσ2 ;
∀i : Xi = (zi+1 − zi−1)si + e′i;
e′′N−1 ← χσ1 ; : (T, sk)
bN−1 = e
′′
N−1 + zN−2NsN−1 +XN−1 · (N − 1)+
X0 · (N − 2) + · · ·+XN−3;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);
T = (z0, . . . , zN−1, X0, . . . , XN−1, hint)

.
Since AdvGKEΠ (t, q) ≤ Pr0[Query], we focus on bounding Pr0[Query] for the rest of the
proof.








corresponding distribution of (T, sk) is thus as follows:
Expt1 :=

a← Rq; ∀i : si, ei ← χσ1 ; zi = asi + ei;
e′1, . . . , e
′
N−1 ← χσ1 ; e′0 ← χσ2






∀i > 0 : Xi = (zi+1 − zi−1)si + e′i : (T, sk)
e′′N−1 ← χσ1 ;
bN−1 = e
′′
N−1 + zN−2NsN−1 +XN−1 · (N − 1)+
X ′0 · (N − 2) + · · ·+XN−3;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);
T = (z0, . . . , zN−1, X
′
0, . . . , XN−1, hint)

.
The following claim, which is the crux of our proof, relates the probabilities
of Query in Expt0 and Expt1.
Claim 3.5. If 2N
√







Proof. Note that we may define the random variables X0, X
′
0 in both experiments










main = as1s0 − asN−1s0 − Error,
it is straightforward to verify that
X0 = main + Error + e
′
0
X ′0 = main + e
′
0,
where e′0 is sampled from χσ2 . Our aim is to apply Theorem 2.3 to show that the
Rényi divergence between X0 and X
′
0 (and hence between Expt0 and Expt1) is small.
To do so, we must first show that the absolute value of each coefficient of Error is
bounded by βRényi with all but negligible probability.

















, and let bound be the event that for all i, j we have |(e′0)j| ≤ cσ2
and |(si)j|, |(ei)j|, |(e′′N−1)j| ≤ cσ1, and that for all i > 0 and all j it holds that
|(e′i)j| ≤ cσ1. Applying Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 (with ρ = λ), we see that










Via a union bound, we thus have
Pr
[
∀j : |Errorj| ≤ 2N
√
nλ3/2σ21 + (N − 1)σ1 | bound
]
≥ 1− 4N · n · 2−2λ.
Under the assumption that 4Nn ≤ 2λ (which holds for all reasonable settings of
the parameters) and using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.3, we
conclude that
Pr[boundErr] ≥ 1− 2−λ+1. (3.7)
When boundErr occurs, Theorem 2.3 tells us that
RD2(Error + χσ2||χσ2) ≤ exp(2πn(βRényi/σ2)2). (3.8)
Therefore,
Pr0[Query] ≤ Pr0[Query | boundErr] + Pr0[boundErr]
≤ Pr0[Query | boundErr] + 2−λ+1
≤
√













This completes the proof of the claim.
Recall that Experiment 0 is the real world experiment. We have that AdvGKEΠ (t, q) ≤
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Pr0[Query], where Query is the event that kN−1 is among the adversary A’s random
oracle queries and Pri[Query] is the probability that event Query happens in Exper-
iment i.





i=1 Xi + e
′







Therefore, to prove the theorem, it remains to show that
Pr1[Query] ≤
(





We do so by considering a sequence of experiments as follows:
Experiment 2. In this experiment, z0 is replaced by a uniform element in Rq. The
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corresponding distribution of (T, sk) is thus as follows:
Expt2 :=

a, z0 ← Rq; ∀i ≥ 1 : si, ei ← χσ1 ; zi = asi + ei;
e′1, . . . , e
′






0,∀i ≥ 1 : Xi = (zi+1 − zi−1)si + e′i : (T, sk)
e′′N−1 ← χσ1 ;
bN−1 = e
′′
N−1 + zN−2NsN−1 +XN−1 · (N − 1)+
X0 · (N − 2) + · · ·+XN−3;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);
T = (z0, . . . , zN−1, X0, . . . , XN−1, hint).

.
Claim 3.6. For any algorithm A running in time t, we have
|Pr2[Query]− Pr1[Query]| ≤ AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,3(t1), (3.9)
where t1 = t+O(N · tring) and tring is the time required to perform operations in Rq.
Proof. We first consider an experiment Expt′1 which is identical to Expt1 except for
(a, z0) given as input. For algorithm A running in time t, let B be an algorithm
running in time t1 which takes as input (a, z0), generates (T, sk) according to Expt
′
1,
runs A(T, sk) as a subroutine and outputs whatever A outputs. t1 is then equal to
t plus a minor overhead for the simulation of the security experiment for A.








1 is identical to Expt2.
Therefore the difference of algorithm A’s success probability in Experiment 1
and Experiment 2 is bounded by probability that B running in time t1 distinguishes
An,q,χσ1 from R
2
q given one sample. Since
AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,3(t1) ≥ Adv
RLWE
n,q,χσ1 ,2
(t1) ≥ AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,1(t1),
for simplicity, we conclude that:
|Pr2[Query]− Pr1[Query]| ≤ AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,3(t1), (3.10)
Recall that in the previous experiment, we switched z0 to be uniformly dis-
tributed in Rq. In next two experiments, we switch z1, X1 to be elements uniformly
distributed in Rq.
Experiment 3. In this experiment, z0 is replaced by z2 − r1, and X1 is replaced
by r1s1 + e
′
1, where r1 is uniform in Rq. The corresponding distribution of (T, sk) is
thus as follows:
Since r1 is uniform, then z2 − r1 is also uniform. Thus, we conclude that
Experiment 3 is identical to Experiment 2 up to variable substitution, namely




a, r1 ← Rq; ∀i ≥ 1 : si, ei ← χσ1 ; zi = asi + ei;
z0 = z2 − r1;






0;X1 = r1s1 + e
′
1; : (T, sk)
∀i ≥ 2 : Xi = (zi+1 − zi−1)si + e′i;
e′′N−1 ← χσ1 ;
bN−1 = e
′′
N−1 + zN−2NsN−1 +XN−1 · (N − 1)+
X0 · (N − 2) + · · ·+XN−3;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);
T = (z0, . . . , zN−1, X0, . . . , XN−1, hint).

.
Experiment 4. In this experiment, z1, X1 are replaced by uniform elements in Rq.




a, r1 ← Rq; ∀i ≥ 2 : si, ei ← χσ1 ; zi = asi + ei;
z0 = z2 − r1, z1 ← Rq;
e′2, . . . , e
′






0, X1 ← Rq;
∀i ≥ 2 : Xi = (zi+1 − zi−1)si + e′i, : (T, sk)
e′′N−1 ← χσ1 ;
bN−1 = e
′′
N−1 + zN−2NsN−1 +XN−1 · (N − 1)+
X0 · (N − 2) + · · ·+XN−3;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);
T = (z0, . . . , zN−1, X0, . . . , XN−1, hint).

.
Claim 3.7. For any algorithm A running in time t, we have
|Pr4[Query]− Pr3[Query]| ≤ AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,3(t1), (3.12)
where t1 = t+O(N · tring) and tring is the time required to perform operations in Rq.
Proof. We first consider an experiment Expt′3 which is identical to Expt3 except for
(a, z1), (r1, X1) given as input. For algorithm A running in time t, let B be an
algorithm running in time t1 that takes as input (a, z1), (r1, X1), generates (T, sk)
according to Expt′3. B then runs A(T, sk) as a subroutine and outputs whatever A
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outputs. t1 is then equal to t plus a minor overhead for the simulation of the security
experiment for A.
It is clear to see that if (a, z1) and (r1, X1) are sampled from An,q,χσ1 , then
Expt′3 is identical to Expt3. If (a, z1) and (r1, X1) are sampled from U(R2q), Expt′3 is
identical to Expt4.
Therefore the difference of algorithm A successful probability in Experiment
3 and Experiment 4 is bounded by the advantage of adversary B running in time t1
in distinguishing An,q,χσ1 from U(R
2
q) given two samples. Thus, we conclude
|Pr4[Query]− Pr3[Query]| ≤ AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,3(t1). (3.13)
Experiment 5. In this experiment, z0 is replaced by a uniform element in Rq. The
corresponding distribution is denoted as Expt5. We leave the formal definition of
Expt5 implicit for simplicity
It is easy to see that the corresponding distribution Expt5 is identical to Expt4
by substituting variable z0 for z2 − r1. Thus,
Pr5[Query] = Pr4[Query]. (3.14)
In the case that N ≥ 3, we present the following sequence of experiments
from Experiment 6 to Experiment 3N − 4. For i = 2, 3, . . . , N − 2, we define three
experiments Experiment 3i, Experiment 3i + 1, Experiment 3i + 2. It is ensured
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that in the experiments prior to Experiment 3i, we already switched zj, Xj for all
0 ≤ j ≤ i − 1. In Experiment 3i, Experiment 3i + 1 and Experiment 3i + 2, we
replace zi and Xi by random elements in Rq. Experiment 3i, Experiment 3i + 1,
Experiment 3i+ 2 are formally defined as follows:
Experiment 3i. The experiment proceeds exactly the same as Experiment 3i− 1,
except for setting zi−1 = zi+1 − ri, Xi = risi + e′i, where r1 is uniform in Rq. The
corresponding distribution of (T, sk) is thus as follows, denoted Expt3i:
Experiment 3i+ 1. In this experiment, zi, Xi are replaced by uniform elements in
Rq. The corresponding distribution of (T, sk) is thus as follows, denoted Expt3i+1:
Experiment 3i + 2. In this experiment, zi−1 is replaced by a uniform element in
Rq. The corresponding distribution is denoted as Expt3i+2. We leave the formal




a, ri ← Rq; ∀j ≥ i : sj, ej ← χσ1 ; zj = asj + ej;
z0, . . . , zi−2 ← Rq, zi−1 = zi+1 − ri;
e′i, . . . , e
′






0, X1, . . . , Xi−1 ← Rq; : (T, sk)
Xi = risi + e
′
i; ∀j ≥ i : Xj+1 = (zj+2 − zj)sj+1 + e′j+1
e′′N−1 ← χσ1 ;
bN−1 = e
′′
N−1 + zN−2NsN−1 +XN−1 · (N − 1)+
X0 · (N − 2) + · · ·+XN−3;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);






a, ri ← Rq; ∀j ≥ i+ 1 : sj, ej ← χσ1 ; zj = asj + ej;
z0, . . . , zi−2 ← Rq, zi−1 = zi+1 − ri, zi ← Rq,
e′1, . . . , e
′






0, X1, . . . , Xi ← Rq, : (T, sk)
∀j ≥ i+ 1, Xj = (zj+1 − zj1)sj + e′j;
e′′N−1 ← χσ1 ;
bN−1 = e
′′
N−1 + zN−2NsN−1 +XN−1 · (N − 1)+
X0 · (N − 2) + · · ·+XN−3;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);
T = (z0, . . . , zN−1, X0, . . . , XN−1, hint).

.
Using similar arguments as proving (in)equalities (3.11), (3.12) and (3.14), we
conclude that:
Pr3i[Query] = Pr3i−1[Query]; (3.15)
|Pr3i+1[Query]− Pr3i[Query]| ≤ AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,3(t1); (3.16)
Pr3i+2[Query] = Pr3i+1[Query]; (3.17)
Note that in Experiment 3N − 4, the last experiment of the experiment se-
quence above, we already switched all the zi, Xi up to zN−1, XN−1. We construct
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the next two experiments to switch zN−1, XN−1, bN−1.
Experiment 3N − 3. The experiment proceeds exactly the same as Experiment
3N − 4, except for setting zN−2 = r2, XN−1 = r1sN−1 + e′N−1, z0 = r1 + r2, where
r1, r2 are uniform in Rq. The corresponding distribution is thus as follows:
Since r1, r2 are uniform, r1 + r2 is then also uniform. Thus we conclude that
Experiment 3N − 3 is identical to Experiment 3N − 4 up to variable substitution,
namely,
Pr3N−3[Query] = Pr3N−4[Query]; (3.18)
Expt3N−3 :=

a, r1, r2 ← Rq, sN−1, eN−1 ← χσ1 ; z0 = r1 + r2,
z1, . . . , zN−3 ← Rq, zN−2 = r2,
zN−1 = asN−1 + eN−1; e
′






0, X1, . . . , XN−2 ← Rq,




N−1 ← χσ1 ; : (T, sk)
bN−1 = e
′′
N−1 + r2NsN−1 +XN−1 · (N − 1)+
X0 · (N − 2) + · · ·+XN−3;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);




Experiment 3N−2. In this experiment, zN−1, XN−1, bN−1 are replaced by uniform
elements in Rq. The corresponding distribution is thus as follows: :
Expt3N−2 :=

a← Rq;∀i : zi ← Rq;






0, X1, . . . , XN−1 ← Rq : (T, sk)
bN−1 ← Rq;
(hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1); sk = H(kN−1);
T = (z0, . . . , zN−1, X0, . . . , XN−1, hint).

.
Claim 3.8. For any algorithm A running in time t, we have
|Pr3N−2[Query]− Pr3N−3[Query]| ≤ AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,3(t1), (3.19)
where t1 = t+O(N · tring) and tring is the time required to perform operations in Rq.
Proof. Since r2 is uniform in Rq and N is invertible over Rq, then r2N is uniformly
distributed in Rq. It is easy to see that (sN−1, r2NsN−1 + e
′′
N−1) forms an RLWE
instance. We let bRLWE = r2NsN−1 + e
′′
N−1.
We consider an experiment Expt′3N−3 which is identical to Expt3N−3 except
for (a, zN−1), (r1, XN−1), and (r2N, bRLWE) given as input. Given an algorithm A
running in time t, let B be an algorithm that takes as input (a, zN−1), (r1, XN−1),
and (r2N, bRLWE), generates (T, sk) according to Expt
′
3N−3. B runs A(T, sk) as a
subroutine and outputs whatever A outputs. Running time t1 of B then equals to
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t plus a minor overhead for the simulation of the security experiment for A.
It is straightforward to see that if (a, zN−1), (r1, X1), and (r2N, bRLWE) are sam-
pled from An,q,χσ1 , then Expt
′
3N−3 is identical to Expt3N−3. If (a, zN−1), (r1, XN−1),
and (r2N, bRLWE) are sampled from R
2
q , then Expt
′
3N−3 is identical to Expt3N−2, since
when bRLWE is sampled uniformly at random, bRLWE + XN−1 · (N − 1) + X0 · (N −
2) + · · ·+XN−3 is also uniformly distributed over Rq.
Therefore the difference of algorithm A’s success probability in Experiment 3N
- 2 and Experiment 3N - 3 is bounded by the advantage of adversary B running in
time t1 in distinguishing Ring-LWE from Rq given three samples. Thus, we conclude
that
|Pr3N−2[Query]− Pr3N−3[Query]| ≤ AdvRLWEn,q,χσ1 ,3(t1), (3.20)
Experiment 3N − 1. In this experiment, kN−1 is replaced by random element in










0, X1, . . . , XN−1 ← Rq
bN−1 ← Rq; (hint, kN−1) = recMsg(bN−1) : (T, sk)
k′N−1 ← {0, 1}λ; sk = H(k′N−1);
T = (z0, . . . , zN−1, X0, . . . , XN−1, hint);

.
Given transcript T, and bN−1 which is uniformly distributed, using a straight
forward reduction, we obtain advantage of adversary B running in time t2 in dis-
tinguishing kN−1 computed by recMsg(bN−1) from a uniform bit string k
′
N−1 with
length λ is at least |Pr3N−1[Query]− Pr3N−2[Query]|, namely,
|Pr3N−1[Query]− Pr3N−2[Query]| ≤ AdvKeyRec(t2). (3.21)
Note that t2 equals to the running time of adversary A attacking the protocol Π,
plus a minor overhead for simulating experiment for A.
Finally, since adversary attacking the GKE protocol Π makes at most q queries
to the random oracle, Pr3N−1[Query] =
q
21λ
∈ negl(1λ). Combining Equations (3.9)
- (3.21), we have





The theorem now follows immediately from Equations (3.6), and (3.22).
Parameter constraints. Beyond the parameter settings required for hardness of
the Ring-LWE problem, the parameters N, n, σ1, σ2, λ, ρ of the protocol are also
required to satisfy the following:





+ 1)σ1 + (N − 2)σ2 ≤ βRec (correctness) (3.23)
2N
√
nλ3/2σ21 + (N − 1)σ1 ≤ βRényi (security) (3.24)
σ2 = Ω(βRényi
√
n/ log 1λ). (security) (3.25)
Thus, fixing the ring, the noise distributions, and the security parameters λ, ρ in-
duces a bound on the maximum number of parties the protocol can support.
Chapter 4: LWE with Side Information: Attacks and Concrete Se-
curity Estimation
4.1 Overview
The ongoing standardization process and anticipated deployment of lattice-
based cryptography raises an important question: How resilient are lattices to side-
channel attacks or other forms of side information? While there are numerous works






Figure 4.1: Primal attack without hints (prior art).
channel attacks targeting lattice-based NIST candidates), these works use rather ad-
hoc methods to reconstruct the secret key, requiring new techniques and algorithms
to be developed for each setting. For example, the work of [25] uses brute-force
methods for a portion of the attack, while [23] exploits linear regression techniques.
Moreover, ad-hoc methods do not allow (1) to take advantage of decades worth
of research and (2) optimization of standard lattice attacks. Second, most of the
side-channel attacks from prior work consider substantial amounts of information
leakage and show that it leads to feasible recovery of the entire key, whereas one
may be interested in more precise tradeoffs in terms of information leakage versus
concrete security of the scheme. The above motivates the focus of this work: Can one
integrate side information into a standard lattice attack and if so, by how much does
the information reduce the cost of this attack? Given that side-channel resistance
is the next step toward the technological readiness of lattice-based cryptography,
and that we expect numerous works in this growing area, we believe that a general
framework and prediction software are in order.
Contributions. First, we propose a framework that generalizes the so-called pri-
mal lattice reduction attack, and allows the progressive integration of “hints” (i.e. side
information that takes one of several forms) before running the final lattice reduc-
tion step. This contribution is summarized in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 and developed in
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Section 4.2.1.
Second, we implement a Sage 9.0 toolkit to actually mount such attacks with
hints when computationally feasible, and to predict their performance on larger in-
stances. Our predictions are validated by extensive experiments. Our tool and these
experiments are described in Section A1.2. Our toolkit is open-source, available at:
https://github.com/lducas/leaky-LWE-Estimator.
Third, we demonstrate the usefulness of our framework and tool via three
example applications. Our main example (Section 4.3.1) revisits the side channel
information obtained from the first side-channel attack of [25] against Frodo. In
that article, it was concluded that a divide-and-conquer side-channel template at-
tack would not lead to a meaningful attack using standard combinatorial search
for reconstruction of the secret. Our technique allows to integrate this side-channel
information into lattice attacks, and to predict the exact security drop. For exam-
ple, the CCS2 parameter set very conservatively aims for 128-bits of post-quantum
security (or 448 “bikz” as defined in Section 4.2.5); but after the leakage of [25] we
predict that its security drops to 29 “bikz”, i.e. that it can be broken with BKZ-29,
a computation that should be more than feasible, but would require a dedicated
re-implementation of our framework.
Interestingly, we note that our framework is not only useful in the side-channel
scenario; we are for example also able to model decryption failures as hints fitting
our framework. This allows us to reproduce some predictions from [49]. This is
discussed in Section 4.3.2.














Figure 4.2: The primal attack with hints (our work).
schemes (LAC [83], Round5 [62], NTRU [116]) without any side-channel or oracle
queries. Indeed, such schemes use ternary distribution for secrets, with a prescribed
number of 1 and −1: this hint fits our framework, and leads to a (very) minor
improvement, discussed in Section 4.3.3.
Lastly, our framework also encompasses and streamlines existing tweaks of
the primal attack: the choice of ignoring certain LWE equations to optimize the
volume-dimension trade-off, as well as the re-centering [94] and isotropization [39,69]
accounting for potential a-priori distortions of the secret. It also implicitly solves the
question of the optimal choice of the coefficient for Kannan’s Embedding from the
Bounded Distance Decoding problem (BDD) to the unique Shortest Vector Problem
(uSVP) [72] (See Remark 4.9).
As a side contribution, we also propose in Section A1.1 a refined method to es-
timate the required blocksize to solve an LWE/BDD/uSVP instance. This refinement
was motivated by the inaccuracy of the standard method from the literature [7,9] in
experimentally reachable blocksizes, which was making the validation of our contri-
bution difficult. While experimentally much more accurate, this new methodology
certainly deserves further scrutiny.
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4.2 Framework
4.2.1 Overview of Our Framework
Our work is based on a generalization of the Bounded Distance Decoding
problem (BDD) to a Distorted version (DBDD), which allows to account for the
potentially non-spherical covariance of the secret vector to be found.
Each hint will affect the lattice itself, the mean and/or the covariance param-
eter of the DBDD instance, making the problem easier (see Figure 4.2). At last, we
make the distribution spherical again by applying a well-chosen linear transforma-
tion, reverting to a spherical BDD instance before running the attack. Thanks to
the hints, this new instance will be easier than the initial one. Let us assume that
v, l, k and σ are parameters known by the attacker. Our framework can handle
four types of hints on the secret s or on the lattice Λ.
• Perfect hints: 〈s, v〉 = l intersect the lattice with an hyperplane.
• Modular hints : 〈s, v〉 = l mod k sparsify the lattice.
• Approximate hints : 〈s, v〉 = l + εσ decrease the covariance of the secret.
• Short vector hints : v ∈ Λ project orthogonally to v.
While the first three hints are clear wins for the performance of lattice attacks, the
last one is a trade-off between the dimension and the volume of the lattice. This last
type of hint is in fact meant to generalize the standard trick consisting of ‘ignoring’
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certain LWE equations; ignoring such an equation can be interpreted geometrically
as such a projection orthogonally to a so-called q-vector.
All the transformations of the lattice above can be computed in polynomial
time. However, computing with general distribution in large dimension is not pos-
sible; we restrict our study to the case of Gaussian distributions of arbitrary covari-
ance, for which such computations are also poly-time.
Some of these transformations remain quite expensive, in particular because
they involve rational numbers with very large denominators, and it remains rather
impractical to run them on cryptographic-grade instances. Fortunately, up to a
necessary hypothesis of primitivity of the vector v (with respect to either Λ or its
dual depending on the type of hint), we can also predict the effect of each hint on
the lattice parameters, and therefore run faster predictions of the attack cost.
From Leaks to Hints. At first, it may not be so clear that the types of hints
above are so useful in realistic applications, in particular since they need to be linear
on the secret. Of course our framework can handle rather trivial hints such as the
perfect leak of a secret coefficient si = l. Slightly less trivial is the case where only
the low-order bits leaks, a hint of the form si = l mod 2.
We note that most of the computations done during an LWE decryption are
linear: leaking any intermediate register during a matrix vector product leads to a
hint of the same form (possibly mod q). Similarly, the leak of a NTT coefficient of
a secret in a Ring/Module variant can also be viewed as such.
Admittedly, such ideal leaks of a full register are not the typical scenario and
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leaks are typically not linear on the content of the register. However, such non-
linearities can be handled by approximate hints. For instance, let s0 be a secret
coefficient (represented by a signed 16-bits integer), whose a priori distribution is
supported by {−5, . . . , 5}. Consider the case where we learn the Hamming weight
of s0, say H(s0) = 2. Then, we can narrow down the possibilities to s0 ∈ {3, 5}.
This leads to two hints:
• a modular hint: s0 = 1 mod 2,
• an approximate hint: s0 = 4 + ε1, where ε1 has variance 1.
While closer to a realistic scenario, the above example remains rather simpli-
fied. A detailed example of how realistic leaks can be integrated as hint will be given
in Section 4.3.1, based on the leakage data from [25].
4.2.2 Definition of Distorted Bounded Distance Decoding
We first recall the definition of the (search) LWE problem, in its short-secret
variant which is the most relevant to practical LWE-based encryption.
Definition 4.1 (Search LWE problem with short secrets.). Let n,m and q be positive
integers, and let χ be a distribution over Z. The search LWE problem (with short
secrets) for parameters (n,m, q, χ) is:
Given the pair
(
A ∈ Zm×nq ,b = zAT + e ∈ Zmq
)
where:
1. A ∈ Zm×nq is sampled uniformly at random,
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2. z ← χn, and e ← χm are sampled with independent and identically dis-
tributed coefficients following the distribution χ.
Find z.
The primal attack (See for example [7]) against (search)-LWE proceeds by
viewing the LWE instance as an instance of a Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD)
problem, converting it to a uSVP instance (via Kannan’s embedding [72]), and finally
applying a lattice reduction algorithm to solve the uSVP instance. The central tool
of our framework is a generalization of BDD that accounts for potential distortion
in the distribution of the secret noise vector that is to be recovered.
Remark 4.2 (Adaptation to the dual attack). In principle, our techniques could
be adapted to the dual attack as well. We focus on only one for conciseness, and
the primal attack appears more pertient and more convenient. Indeed, the dual
attack is very rarely better than the primal one [5], and this despite making more
simplifications in favor of the attacker. Furthermore, the dual attack has not been
the object of experimental verification studies, unlike the primal one. At last, the
cost of the dual attack is not necessarily indepedent of the underlying SVP-algorithm;
some analysis for example exploit the fact that sieving outputs many short vectors
rather than one.
Definition 4.3 (Distorted Bounded Distance Decoding problem). Let Λ ⊂ Rd be a
lattice, Σ ∈ Rd×d be a symmetric matrix and µ ∈ Span(Λ) ⊂ Rd such that
Span(Σ) ( Span(Σ + µT · µ) = Span(Λ). (4.1)
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The Distorted Bounded Distance Decoding problem DBDDΛ,µ,Σ is the following prob-
lem:
Given µ,Σ and a basis of Λ.
Find the unique vector x ∈ Λ ∩ E(µ,Σ)
where E(µ,Σ) denotes the ellipsoid
E(µ,Σ) := {x ∈ µ + Span(Σ)|(x− µ) ·Σ∼ · (x− µ)T ≤ rank(Σ)}.
We will refer to the triple I = (Λ,µ,Σ) as the instance of the DBDDΛ,µ,Σ problem.
Intuitively, Definition 4.3 corresponds to knowing that the secret vector x to
be recovered follows a distribution of variance Σ and average µ. The quantity
(x − µ) · Σ∼ · (x − µ)T can be interpreted as a non-canonical Euclidean squared
distance ‖x − µ‖2Σ, and the expected value of such a distance for a Gaussian x of
variance Σ and average µ is rank(Σ). One can argue that, for such a Gaussian,
there is a constant probability that ‖x−µ‖2Σ is slightly greater than rank(Σ). Since
we are interested in the average behavior of our attack, we ignore this benign tech-
nical detail. In fact, we will typically interpret DBDD as the promise that the secret
follows a Gaussian distribution of center µ and covariance Σ.
The ellipsoid can be seen as an affine transformation (that we call “distortion”)
of the centered hyperball of radius rank(Σ). Let us introduce a notation for the
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hyperball; for any d ∈ N
Bd := {x ∈ Rd | ‖x‖2 ≤ d}. (4.2)
One can thus write using Definition 2.18:
E(µ,Σ) = Brank(Σ) ·
√
Σ + µ. (4.3)
From the Span inclusion in Equation (4.1), one can deduce that the condition is
equivalent to requiring µ /∈ Span(Σ) and rank(Σ+µT ·µ) = rank(Σ)+1 = rank(Λ).
This technical detail is necessary for embedding it properly into a uSVP instance
(See later in Section 4.2.4).
Particular cases of Definition 4.3. Let us temporarily ignore the condition in Equa-
tion (4.1) to study some particular cases. As shown in Figure 4.3, when Σ = Id,
DBDDΛ,µ,Id is BDD instance. Indeed, the ellipsoid becomes a shifted hyperball
E(µ, Id) = {x ∈ µ + Rd×d | ‖x − µ‖2 ≤ d} = Bd + µ. If in addition µ = 0,
DBDDΛ,0,Id becomes a uSVP instance on Λ.
4.2.3 Embedding LWE into DBDD
In the typical primal attack framework (Figure 4.1), one directly views LWE as
a BDD instance of the same dimension. For our purposes, however, it will be useful
to apply Kannan’s Embedding at this stage and therefore increase the dimension
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DBDD BDD uSVP
Figure 4.3: Graphical intuition of DBDD, BDD and uSVP in dimension two: the
problem consists in finding a nonzero element of Λ in the colored zone. The identity
hyperball is larger for uSVP to represent the fact that, during the reduction, the
uSVP lattice has one dimension more than for BDD.
of the lattice by 1. While it could be delayed to the last stage of our attack, this
extra fixed coefficient 1 will be particularly convenient when we integrate hints (see
Remark 4.9 in Section 4.2.6). It should be noted that no information is lost through
this transformation, since the parameters µ and Σ allow us to encode the knowledge
that the solution we are looking for has its last coefficient set to 1 and nothing else.
In more details, the solution s := (e, z) of an LWE instance is extended to
s̄ := (e, z, 1) (4.4)
which is a short vector in the lattice Λ =
{
(x,y, w) |x + yAT − bw = 0 mod q
}
.






Denoting µχ and σ
2
χ the average and variance of the LWE distribution χ (See
Definition 4.1), we can convert this LWE instance to a DBDDΛ,µ,Σ instance with
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. The lattice Λ is of full rank in Rd where
d := m + n + 1, and its volume is qm. Note that the rank of Σ is only d − 1: the
ellipsoid has one less dimension than the lattice. It then validates the requirement
of Equation (4.1).
Remark 4.4. Typically, Kannan’s embedding from BDD to uSVP leaves the bottom
right matrix coefficient as a free parameter, say c, to be chosen optimally. The




(m+ n)σχ + c
(c · qm)1/d
,
namely, c = σχ according to the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality. Some prior
works [7,11] instead chose c = 1. While this is benign since σχ is typically not too far
from 1, it remains a sub-optimal choice. Looking ahead, in our DBDD framework,
this choice becomes irrelevant thanks to the isotropization step introduced in the next
section; we can therefore choose c = 1 without worwsening the attack.
4.2.4 Converting DBDD to uSVP
In this Section, we explain how a DBDD instance (Λ,µ,Σ) is converted into
a uSVP one. Two modifications are necessary. First, we need to homogeneize the
problem. Let us show that the ellipsoid in Definition 4.3 is contained in a larger
centered ellipsoid (with one more dimension) as follows:
E(µ,Σ) ⊂ E(0,Σ + µT · µ). (4.5)
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Using Equation (4.3), one can write
E(µ,Σ) = Brank(Σ) ·
√
Σ + µ ⊂ Brank(Σ) ·
√
Σ± µ,
where Brank(Σ) is defined in Equation (4.2). And, with Equation (4.1), one can
deduce rank(Σ + µT · µ) = rank(Σ) + 1, then:
Brank(Σ) ·
√






We apply Definition 2.18 which confirms the inclusion of Equation (4.5):





 = E(0,Σ + µT · µ).
Thus, we can homogenize and transform the instance into a centered one with
Σ′ := Σ + µT · µ.
Secondly, to get an isotropic distribution (i.e. with all its eigenvalues being 1),
one can just multiply every element of the lattice with the pseudoinverse of
√
Σ′.












Σ′ = ΠΣ′ (see Section 2.4.1), Σ
′′ = ΠΣ′ = ΠΛ, the last equality
coming from Equation (4.1).
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In summary, one must make by the two following changes:
homogenize: (Λ,µ,Σ) 7→ (Λ,0,Σ′ := Σ + µT · µ)
isotropize: (Λ,0,Σ′) 7→ (Λ ·M,0,ΠΛ)
where M := (
√
Σ′)∼. From the solution x to the uSVPΛ·M problem, one can derive
x′ = xM∼ the solution to the DBDDΛ,µ,Σ problem.
Remark 4.5. One may note that we could solve a DBDD instance without isotropiza-
tion simply by including the ellipsoid in a larger ball, and directly apply lattice reduc-
tion before the second step. This leads, however, to less efficient attacks. One may
also note that the first homogenization step “forgets” some information about the
secret’s distribution. This, however, is inherent to the conversion to a unique-SVP
problem which is geometrically homogeneous, and is already present in the original
primal attack.
4.2.5 Security estimates of uSVP: bikz versus bits
The attack on a uSVP instance consists of applying BKZ-β on the uSVP lattice
Λ for an appropriate block size parameter β. The cost of the attack grows with
β, however, modeling this cost precisely is at the moment rather delicate, as the
state of the art seems to still be in motion. Numerous NIST candidates choose to
underestimate this cost, keeping a margin to accommodate future improvements,
and there seems to be no clear consensus on which model to use (see [5] for a
summary of existing cost models).
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While this problem is orthogonal to our work, we still wish to be able to
formulate quantitative security losses. We therefore express all concrete security
estimates using the blocksize β as our measure of the level of security, and treat the
latter as a measurement of the security level in a unit called the bikz. We thereby
leave the question of the exact bikz-to-bit conversion estimate outside the scope of
this paper, and recall that those conversion formulae are not necessarily linear, and
may have small dependency in other parameters. For the sake of concreteness, we
note that certain choose, for example, to claim 128 bits of security for 380 bikz, and
in this range, most models suggest a security increase of one bit every 2 to 4 bikz.
Remark 4.6. We also clarify that the estimates given in this paper only concern the
pure lattice attack via the uSVP embedding discussed above. In particular, we note
that some NIST candidates with ternary secrets [83] also consider the hybrid attack
of [70], which we ignore in this work. We nevertheless think that the compatibility
with our framework is plausible, with some effort.
Predicting β from a uSVP instance The state-of-the-art predictions for solving
uSVP instances using BKZ were given in [7,9]. Namely, for Λ a lattice of dimension
dim(Λ), it is predicted that BKZ-β can solve a uSVPΛ instance with secret s when
√
β/ dim(Λ) · ‖s‖ ≤ δ2β−dim(Λ)−1β · Vol(Λ)
1/ dim(Λ) (4.6)
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where δβ is the so called root-Hermite-Factor of BKZ-β. For β ≥ 50, the Root-









Note that the uSVP instances we generate are isotropic and centered so that
the secret has covariance Σ = I (or Σ = ΠΛ if Λ is not of full rank) and µ = 0.
Thus, on average, we have ‖s‖2 = rank(Σ) = dim(Λ). Therefore, β can be estimated
as the minimum integer that satisfies
√
β ≤ δ2β−dim(Λ)−1β · Vol(Λ)
1/dim(Λ). (4.8)
While β must be an integer as a BKZ parameter, we nevertheless provide a contin-
uous value, for a finer comparison of the difficulty of an instance. Below, we will
call this method the ”GSA-Intersect” method.
Remark 4.7. To predict security, one does not need the basis of Λ, but only its
dimension and its volume. Similarly, it is not necessary to explicitly compute
the isotropization matrix M of Section 4.2.4, thanks to Fact 2.20: Vol(Λ ·M) =
rdet(M) Vol(Λ) = rdet(Σ′)−1/2 Vol(Λ). These two shortcuts will allow us to ef-
ficiently make predictions for cryptographically large instances, in our lightweight
implementation of Section A1.2.
Refined prediction for small blocksizes For experimental validation purposes of
our work, we prefer to have accurate prediction even for small blocksizes; a regime
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where those predictions are not accurate with the current state of the art. We
therefore present a refined strategy using BKZ-simulation and a probabilistic model
in Appendix A1.1.
4.2.6 Hints and their integration
In thie section, we define several categories of hints—perfect hints, modular
hints, approximate hints (conditioning and a posteriori), and short vector
hints—and show that these types of hints can be integrated into a DBDD instance.
Hints belonging to these categories typically have the form of a linear equation in
s (and possibly additional variables). As emphasized in Section 4.1, these hints
have lattice-friendly forms and their usefulness in realistic applications may not be
obvious. We refer to Section 4.3 for detailed applications of these hints.
The technical challenge, therefore, is to characterize the effect of such hints
on the DBDD instance—i.e. determine the resulting (Λ′,µ′,Σ′) of the new DBDD
instance, after the hint is incorporated.
Henceforth, let I = DBDDΛ,µ,Σ be a fixed instance constructed from an LWE
instance with secret s = (z, e). Each hint will introduce new constraints on s and
will ultimately decrease the security level.
Non-Commutativity. It should be noted that many types of hints commute:
Integrating them in any order will lead to the same DBDD instance. Potential ex-
ceptions are non-smooth modular hints (See later in Section 4.2.6.2) and apos-
teriori approximate hints (See later in Section 4.2.6.4): they do not always
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commute with the other types of hints, and do not always commute between them-
selves, unless the vectors v’s of those hints are all orthogonal to each other. The
reason is: in these cases, the distribution in the direction of v is redefined which
erases the prior information.
4.2.6.1 Perfect Hints
Definition 4.8 (Perfect hint). A perfect hint on the secret s is the knowledge of
v ∈ Zd−1 and l ∈ Z, such that
〈s, v〉 = l.
A perfect hint is quite strong in terms of additional knowledge. It allows
decreasing the dimension of the lattice by one and increases its volume. One could
expect such hints to arise from the following scenarios:
• The full leak without noise of an original coefficient, or even an unreduced
intermediate register since most of the computations are linear. For the second
case, one may note that optimized implementations of NTT typically attempt
to delay the first reduction modulo q, so leaking a register on one of the first
few levels of the NTT would indeed lead to such a hint.
• A noisy leakage of the same registers, but with still a rather high guessing
confidence. In that case it may be worth making the guess while decreasing
the success probability of the attack.1 This could happen in a cold-boot attack
1One may then re-amplify the success probability by retrying the attack making guesses at
different locations.
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scenario. This is also the case in the single trace attack on Frodo [25] that we
will study as one of our examples in Section 4.3.1.
• More surprisingly, certain schemes, including some NIST candidates offer such
a hint ‘by design’. Indeed, LAC, Round5 and NTRU-HPS all choose ternary
secret vectors with a prescribed number of 1’s and −1’s, which directly induce
one or two such perfect hints. This will be detailed in Section 4.3.3.
Integrating a perfect hint into a DBDD instance Let v ∈ Zd−1 and l ∈ Z be such
that 〈s,v〉 = l. Note that the hint can also be written as
〈s̄, v̄〉 = 0,
where s̄ is the extended LWE secret as defined in Equation (4.4) and v̄ := (v ; −l).
Remark 4.9. Here we understand the interest of using Kannan’s embedding be-
fore integrating hints rather than after: it allows to also homogenize the hint, and
therefore to make Λ′ a proper lattice rather than a lattice coset (i.e. a shifted lattice).
Including this hint is done by modifying the DBDDΛ,µ,Σ to DBDDΛ′,µ′,Σ′ ,
where:
Λ′ = Λ ∩
{
x ∈ Zd | 〈x, v̄〉 = 0
}








We now explain how to derive the new mean µ′ and the new covariance Σ′.
Let y be the random variable 〈s̄, v̄〉, where s̄ has mean µ and covariance Σ. Then
µ′ is the mean of s̄ conditioned on y = 0, and Σ′ is the covariance of s̄ conditioned
on y = 0. Using Corollary 2.7, we obtain the corresponding conditional mean and
covariance.
We note that lattice Λ′ is an intersection of Λ and a hyperplane orthogonal to
v̄. Given B as basis of Λ, by Lemma 2.9 a basis of Λ′ can be computed as follows:
1. Let D be dual basis of B. Compute D⊥ := D ·Π⊥v̄ .
2. Apply the LLL algorithm on D⊥ to eliminate linear dependencies. Then delete
the first row of D⊥ (which is 0 because with the hyperplane intersection, the
dimension of the lattice is decremented).
3. Output the dual of the resulting matrix.
While polynomial time, the above computation is quite heavy, especially as there is
no convenient library offering a parallel version of LLL. Fortunately, for predicting
attack costs, one only needs the dimension of the lattice Λ and its volume. These
can easily be computed assuming v̄ is a primitive vector (see Definition 2.11) of the
dual lattice: the dimension decreases by 1, and the volume increases by a factor
||v̄||. This is proved by the following Lemma.
To predict the hardness of the lattice reduction on altered instances, we must
compute the volume of the final transformed lattice. We devise a highly efficient
way to do this, by observing that each time a hint is integrated, we can update the
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volume of the transformed lattice, given only the volume of the previous lattice and
information about the current hint (under mild restrictions on the form of the hint).
Lemma 4.10 (Volume of a lattice slice). Given a lattice Λ with volume Vol(Λ), and
a primitive vector v with respect to Λ∗. Let v⊥ denote subspace orthogonal to v.
Then Λ ∩ v⊥ is a lattice with volume Vol(Λ ∩ v⊥) = ‖v‖ · Vol(Λ).










Vol (Λ∗ ∩ Span(v))
Vol(Λ∗)
(4.12)
= Vol (Λ∗ ∩ Span(v)) Vol(Λ),
where Equation (4.11) follows from Lemma 2.9, and Equation (4.12) follows from
Lemma 2.10. By Definition 2.11, v generates the one-dimensional lattice Λ∗ ∩
Span(v), and Vol(Λ∗ ∩ Span(v)) = ‖v‖. Therefore we have Vol(Λ′) = ‖v‖ · Vol(Λ).
Intuitively, the primitivity condition is needed since then one can scale the leak
to 〈s, fv〉 = fl for any non-zero factor f ∈ R and get an equivalent leak; however
there is only one factor f that can ensure that f v̄ ∈ Λ∗, and is primitive in it.
Remark 4.11. Note that if v̄ is not in the span of Λ—as typically occurs if other
non-orthogonal perfect hints have already been integrated—Lemma 4.10 should be
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applied to the orthogonal projection v̄′ = v̄ ·ΠΛ of v̄ onto Λ. Indeed, the perfect hint
〈s̄, v̄′〉 = 0 replacing v̄ by v̄′ is equally valid.
4.2.6.2 Modular Hints
Definition 4.12 (Modular hint). A modular hint on the secret s is the knowledge
of v ∈ Zd−1, k ∈ Z and l ∈ Z, such that
〈s, v〉 = l mod k.
We can expect such hints to arise from several scenarios:
• obtaining the value of an intermediate register during LWE decryption would
likely correspond to giving such a modular equation modulo q. This is also
the case if an NTT coefficient leaks in a Ring-LWE scheme. It can also occur
“by design” if the LWE secret is chosen so that certain NTT coordinates are
fixed to 0 modulo q, as is the case in some instances of Order LWE [20].
• obtaining the absolute value a = |s| of a coefficient s implies s = a mod 2a,
and such a hint could be obtained by a timing attack on an unprotected
implementation of a table-based sampler, in the spirit of [34].
• obtaining the Hamming weight of the string b1b2 . . . b′1b′2 . . . used to sample




b′i (as done in NewHope and
Kyber [100, 105]) reveals in particular s mod 2. Indeed, the latter string (or
at least some parts of it) is more likely to be leaked than the Hamming weight
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of s.
Integrating a modular hint into a DBDD instance. Let v ∈ Zd−1; k ∈ Z and l ∈ Z
be such that 〈s,v〉 = l mod k. Note that the hint can also be written as
〈s̄, v̄〉 = 0 mod k (4.13)
where s̄ is the extended LWE secret as defined in Equation 4.4 and v̄ := (v ; −l).
We refer to Remark 4.9 for the legitimacy of such dimension increase.
Smooth case. Intuitively, such a hint should only sparsify the lattice, and leave
the average and the variance unchanged. This is not entirely true, this is only
(approximately) true when the variance is sufficiently large in the direction of v to
ensure smoothness, i.e. when k2  vΣvT ; one can refer to [91, Lemma 3.3 and
Lemma 4.2] for the quality of that approximation. In this smooth case, we therefore
have:
Λ′ = Λ ∩
{
x ∈ Zd | 〈x, v̄〉 = 0 mod k
}
(4.14)
µ′ = µ (4.15)
Σ′ = Σ (4.16)
On the other hand, if k2  vΣvT , then the residual distribution will be highly
concentrated on a single value, and one should therefore instead use a perfect
〈s, v〉 = l + ik for some i.
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General case. In the general case, one can resort to a numerical computation of
the average µc and the variance σ
2
c of the one-dimensional centered discrete Gaussian
of variance σ2 = vΣvT over the coset l + kZ, and apply the corrections:












Intuitively, these formulae completely erase prior information on 〈s, v̄〉, before it is
replaced by the new average and variance in the adequate direction. Both can be
derived2 using Corollary 2.7.
As for perfect hints, the computation of Λ′ can be done by working on the
dual lattice. More specifically:
1. Let D be dual basis of B.
2. Redefine v̄← v̄ ·ΠΛ, noting that this does not affect the validity of the hint.
3. Append v̄/k to D and obtain D′
4. Apply the LLL algorithm on D′ to eliminate linear dependencies. Then delete
the first row of D′ (which is 0 since we introduced a linear dependency).
5. Output the dual of the resulting matrix.
Also, as for perfect hints the parameters of the new lattice Λ′ can be predicted: the
2We are thankful to Thibauld Feneuil for pointing out an incorrect equation in a previous
version of this paper.
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dimension is unchanged, and the volume increases by a factor k under a primitivity
condition, which is proved by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.13 (Volume of a sparsified lattice). Let Λ be a lattice, v ∈ Λ∗ be a
primitive vector of Λ∗, and k > 0 be an integer. Let Λ′ = {x ∈ Λ | 〈x,v〉 = 0 mod k}
be a sublattice of Λ. Then Vol(Λ′) = k · Vol(Λ).
Proof. Because v̄ is a dual vector of Λ, we have 〈v̄,Λ〉 ⊂ Z. Let ` be such that,
〈v̄,Λ〉 = `Z. Note that v̄/` ∈ Λ∗, therefore, by primitivity of v̄, we have ` = 1. In
particular, the group morphism φ : x ∈ Λ 7→ 〈x, v̄〉 mod k is surjective. Note that
Λ′ = kerφ, therefore we have |Λ/Λ′| = |Zk| = k. We conclude.
4.2.6.3 Approximate Hints (conditioning)
Definition 4.14 (Approximate hint). An approximate hint on the secret s is the
knowledge of v ∈ Zd−1 and l ∈ Z, such that
〈s, v〉+ e = l,
where e models noise following a distribution N1(0, σ
2
e), independent of s.
One can expect such hints from:
• any noisy side channel information about a secret coefficient. This is the case
of our study in Section 4.3.1.
• decryption failures. In Section 4.3.2, we show how this type of hint can repre-
sent the information gained by a decryption failure.
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To include this knowledge in the DBDD instance, we must combine this knowledge
with the prior knowledge on the solution s of the instance.
Integrating an approximate hint into a DBDD instance Let v ∈ Zd−1 and l ∈ Z be
such that 〈s,v〉 ≈ l. Note that the hint can also be written as
〈s̄, v̄〉+ e = 0 (4.19)
where s̄ is the extended LWE secret as defined in Equation (4.4), v̄ := (v ; −l), and
e has N1(0, σ
2
e) distribution. The unique shortest non-zero solution of DBDDΛ,µ,Σ,
is also the unique solution of the instance DBDDΛ′,µ′,Σ′ where
Λ′ = Λ (4.20)




µ′ = µ− 〈v̄,µ〉
v̄Σv̄T + σ2e
v̄Σ (4.22)
We note that Equation (4.20) comes from
Λ′ := Λ ∩
{
x ∈ Zd | 〈x, v̄〉+ e = 0, for all possible e ∼ N1(0, σ2e)
}
= Λ.
The new covariance and mean follow from Corollary 2.7.
Consistency with Perfect Hint Note that if σe = 0, we fall back to a perfect hint
〈s,v〉 = l. The above computation of Σ′ (4.21) (resp. µ′ (4.22)) is indeed equivalent
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to Equation (4.9) (resp. Equation (4.10)) from Section 4.2.6.1. Note however, in our
implementation, that to avoid singularities, we require the span of Span(Σ+µTµ) =
Span(Λ) (See the requirement in Equation (4.1)): If σe = 0, one must instead use a
Perfect hint.
Multi-dimensional approximate hints The formulae of [82] are even more general,
and one could consider a multidimensional hint of the form sV + e = l, where V ∈
Rn×k and e a gaussian noise of any covariance Σe. However, those general formulae
require explicit matrix inversion which becomes impractical in large dimension. We
therefore only implemented full-dimensional (k = n) hint integration in the super-
lightweight version of our tool, which assumes all covariance matrices to be diagonal.
These will be used for hints obtained from decryption failures in Section 4.3.2.
4.2.6.4 Approximate Hint (a posteriori)
In certain scenarios, one may more naturally obtain directly the a posteriori
distribution of 〈s,v〉, rather than a hint 〈s,v〉+ e = l for some error e independent
of s. Such a scenario is typical in template attacks, as we exemplify via the single
trace attack on Frodo from [25], which we study in Section 4.3.1.
Given the a posteriori distribution of 〈s̄, v̄〉, one can derive its mean µap and
variance σ2ap and apply the corrections to compute the new mean and covariance
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exactly as in Equations (4.17) and (4.18).
Λ′ = Λ (4.23)












4.2.6.5 Short vector hints
Definition 4.15 (Short vector hint). A short vector hint on the lattice Λ is the
knowledge of a short vector v̄ such that
v̄ ∈ Λ.
Note that such hints are not related to the secret, and are not expected to be
obtained by side-channel information, but rather by the very design of the scheme. In
particular, the lattice Λ underlying LWE instance modulo q contains the so-called q-
vectors, i.e. the vectors (q, 0, 0, . . . , 0) and its permutations. These vectors are in fact
implicitly exploited in the literature on the cryptanalysis of LWE since at least [81].
Indeed, in some regimes, the best attacks are obtained by ‘forgetting’ certain LWE
equations, which can be geometrically interpreted as a projection orthogonally to a
q-vector. Note that, among all hints, the short vector hints should be the last to be
integrated. In our context, we need to generalize this idea beyond q-vector because
the q-vectors may simply disappear after the integration of a perfect or modular
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hint. For example, after the integration of a perfect hint 〈s, (1, 1, . . . , 1)〉 = 0, all
the q-vectors are no longer in the lattice, but (q,−q, 0, . . . , 0) still is, and so are all
its permutations.
Resolving the DBDD problem resulting from this projection will not directly
lead to the original secret, as projection is not injective. However, as long as we
keep n+ 1 dimensions out of the n+m+ 1 dimensions of the original LWE instance,
we can still efficiently reconstruct the full LWE secret by solving a linear system over
the rationals.
Integrating a short vector hint into a DBDD instance It is the case when the secret
vector is short enough to be a solution after applying projection Π⊥v̄ on DBDDΛ,Σ,µ
.
Λ′ = Λ ·Π⊥v̄ (4.26)
Σ′ = (Π⊥v̄ )
T ·Σ ·Π⊥v̄ (4.27)
µ′ = µ ·Π⊥v̄ (4.28)
To compute a basis of Λ′ one can simply apply the projection to all the vectors
of its current basis, and then eliminate linear dependencies in the resulting basis
using LLL.
Remark 4.16. Once a short vector hint v̄ ∈ Λ has been integrated, Λ has been
transformed into Λ′. And, if one has to perform another short vector hint integra-
tion v̄1 ∈ Λ, v̄1 should be projected onto Λ′ with v̄ ·ΠΛ′ ∈ Λ′. In our implementation
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however, this has been taken into account and one can simply apply the same trans-
formation as above, replacing a single vector v̄ by a matrix V.
The dimension of the lattice decreases by one (or by k, if one directly integrates
a matrix of k vectors) and the volume of the lattice also decreases according to
Fact 4.17.
Fact 4.17 (Volume of a projected lattice). Let Λ be a lattice, v ∈ Λ be a primitive
vector of Λ. Let Λ′ = Λ · Π⊥v be a sublattice of Λ. Then Vol(Λ′) = Vol(Λ)/‖v‖.




One can also predict the decrease of the determinant of Σ via the identity:
rdet(Σ′) = rdet(Σ) · ‖v̄‖
2
v̄Σv̄T




Worthiness and choice of short vector hints Integrating such a hint induces a trade-
off between the dimension and the volume, and therefore it is not always advanta-
geous to integrate.
This raises the following potentially hard problem: given a set W of short
vectors of Λ (viewed as a matrix), which subset V ⊂W of size k lead to the easiest










In the case of an un-hinted DBDD instance directly obtained from the LWE
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problem, for V being the set of (primitive) q-vectors, the problem is easier: all
subsets of size k lead to instances with the same parameters.
But this is not true anymore as soon as Σ has been altered or if the set W is
arbitrary. For example, setting Σ = I, one simply wishes to minimize det(VVT );
but for an arbitrary set W the problem of finding the optimal subset V ⊂ W is
NP-hard [77], and remains NP-hard up to exponential approximation factors.
A natural approach to try to get an approximate solution in polynomial time
consists in making sequential greedy choices. This involves computing |V|·|W|many
matrix-vector products over increasingly large rationals, and appeared painfully slow
in practice for making prediction on cryptographically large instances. Fortunately,
in the typical cases where the vectors of W are the q-vectors, this can be made
somewhat practical (See Section 4.3.3 for example).
Remark 4.18. When the basis of an LWE-lattice is given in its systematic form, the
q-vectors are already explicitly given to lattice reduction algorithms, and these algo-
rithms will implicitly make use of them when they are worthy, as if we had integrated
them. The reason is that lattice reduction algorithm naturally work with projected
sublattices, and if a q-vector is shorter than what the algorithm can produce, those
q-vectors will remain untouched at the beginning of the basis; the reduction algorithm
will effectively work on the lattice projected orthogonally to them. In other words,
integrating q-vectors is important to understand and predict how lattice reduction
algorithm will work, but, in certain cases they may be automatically detected and
exploited by lattice reduction algorithms themselves.
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4.3 Applications examples
4.3.1 Hints from side channels
In [25], W. Bos et al. study the feasibility of a single-trace power analysis of
the Frodo Key Encapsulation Mechanism (FrodoKEM) [92]. Specifically, in the first
approach, they analyze the possibility of a divide-and-conquer attack targeting a
multiplication in the key generation. This attack was claimed unsuccessful in [25]
because the bruteforce phase after recovering a candidate for the private key was
too expensive. Along with this unsuccessful result, a successful powerful extend-
and-prune attack is provided in [25].
We emphasize that the purpose of this section is to exemplify our tool on a
standard side-channel attack, and this is why we choose the former unsuccessful
divide-and-conquer attack of [25]. The point of this section is to show that our
framework can indeed lead to improvements in the algorithmic phase of a side-
channel attack, once the leak has been fixed.
FrodoKEM. FrodoKEM is based on small-secret-LWE; we outline here some de-
tails necessary to understand the attack. Note that we use different letter notations
from [92] for consistency. For parameters n and q, the private key is (z ∈ Znq , e ∈ Znq )
where the coefficients of z and e, denoted zi and ei, can take several values in a
small set that we denote L. The public key is
(
A ∈ Zn×nq ,b = zA + e
)
. The goal
of the attack is to recover z by making measurements during the multiplication
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between z and A when computing b in the key generation. Note that there is
no multiplication involving e and thus it is not targeted in this attack. Six sets
of parameters are considered: CCS1, CCS2, CCS3 and CCS4 introduced in [24]
and NIST1 and NIST2 introduced in [92]. For example, with NIST1 parameters,
n = 640, q = 215 and L = {−11, · · · , 11}.
n = 640, q = 215 and L = {−11, · · · , 11}.
Side-channel simulation. The divide-and-conquer attack provided by [25] simulates
side-channel information using ELMO, a power simulator for a Cortex M0 [89]. This
tool outputs simulated power traces using an elaborate leakage model with Gaussian
noise. Thus, it is parametrized by the standard deviation of the side-channel noise.
For proofs of concept, the authors of [89] suggest to choose the standard deviation
of the simulated noise as σSimNoise := 0.0045 for realistic leakage modeling. This
standard deviation was also the one chosen in [25, Fig. 2b] and W. Bos et al. imple-
mented a Matlab script that calls ELMO to simulate the side-channel information
applied on Frodo. This precise side-channel simulator was provided to us by the
authors of [25] and we were able to re-generate all their data with Matlab, again
using σSimNoise = 0.0045.
Template attack. The divide-and-conquer side-channel attack proposed by W. Bos
et al. belongs in the template attack family. Template attacks were introduced
in [37]. In a nutshell, these attacks include a profiling phase and an online phase.
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Let us detail the template attack for Frodo implemented in [25].
1. The profiling phase consists in using a copy of the device and recording a
large number of traces using many different known secret values. From these
measures, the attacker can derive the multidimensional distribution of several
points of interest when the traces share the same secret coefficient. More
precisely, in the case of FrodoKEM, for a given index i ∈ [0, n−1], the points of
interest will be the instants in the trace when zi is multiplied by the coefficients
of A (n interest points in total). Let us define
ci := (T [ti,0], . . . , T [ti,n−1]) c ∈ Rn, (4.31)
where T denotes the trace measurement and (ti,k) denotes the instants of the
multiplication of zi with the coefficients Ai,k for (i, k) ∈ [0, n−1]. The random
variable vector associated to ci is denoted by Ci. For each i ∈ [0, n − 1] and
x ∈ L, the goal of the profiling phase is to learn the center of the probability
distribution
Ai,x(c) := P [Ci = c | zi = x] .
By hypothesis, for template attacks (see [37, Section 2.1]), Ai,x is assumed to
follow a multidimenstional normal distribution of standard deviation σSimNoise ·
In. Thus, the attacker recovers the center of Ai,x for each i ∈ [0, n − 1] and
x ∈ L by averaging all the measured ci that validate zi = x. The center of Ai,x
is denoted ti,x and we call it a template. W. Bos et al. [25] actually assume that
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ti,x depends only on x and is independent from the index i. Thus, ti,x = tx.
Essentially, this common assumption implies that the index i ∈ [0, n−1] of the
target coefficient does not influence the leakage. Consequently, the attacker
only has to derive t0,x, for example.
2. In a second step, the attacker knows the templates tx for all x ∈ L. She also
knows the points of interest ti,k as defined above in Equation 4.31. She will
construct a candidate z̃ for the secret z by recovering the coefficients one by
one. For each unknown secret coefficient zi, she takes the measurement ci
as defined in Equation 4.31. Using this measurement, she can derive an a
posteriori probability distribution: With her fixed i ∈ [0, n− 1] and measured
ci ∈ R, she computes for all x ∈ L,
P [zi = x | Ci = ci] =
P [zi = x]
P [Ci = ci]
· P [Ci = ci | zi = x] (4.32)








In [25], a score table, denoted (Si[x])x∈L is derived from the a posteriori dis-
tribution as follows,
Si[x] := ln (P [zi = x | Ci = ci]) (4.34)








-11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4
0 -4098 -3918 -4344 -2580 -3212 -3108 -3758 -3155
1 -3273 -3114 -3491 -1951 -2495 -2405 -2972 -2445
−1 -341 -335 -352 -465 -358 -369 -329 -362
−1 -306 -298 -319 -414 -314 -323 -290 -317
. . . -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
0 . . . -3583 -3498 -3900 -340 -380 -367 -452
1 . . . -2819 -2744 -3098 -365 -325 -328 -338
−1 . . . -331 -334 -328 -3712 -3079 -3195 -2656
−1 . . . -291 -293 -291 -3608 -2982 -3097 -2564
. . . 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0 . . . -818 -975 -933 -1084 -368 -459 -453 -592
1 . . . -546 -657 -627 -737 -333 -344 -342 -407
−1 . . . -1696 -1461 -1521 -1329 -3231 -2648 -2685 -2201
−1 . . . -1617 -1385 -1444 -1256 -3132 -2556 -2593 -2115
Table 4.1: Examples of scores associated to the secret values si ∈ {0,±1}, after
the side-channel analysis of [25] for NIST1 parameters. The best score in each score
table is highlighted. This best guess is correct for the first 3 score table, but incorrect
for the last one.
One can use the presented attack as a “black-box” to generate the score tables
using the script from [25]. As an example, using the NIST1 parameters, we show
several measured scores (S[−11], · · · , S[11]) corresponding to several secret coeffi-
cients in Table 4.1. The first line corresponds to a secret equal to 0, the second
line to 1 and the third and fourth line to −1. The last line is an example of failed
guessing because we see that the outputted candidate is not −1. We remark that
the values having the opposite sign are assigned a very low score, we conjecture that
it is because the sign is filling the register and then the Hamming weight of the
register will be very far from the correct one.
With this template attack, one can recover z̃ ≈ z. However, W. Bos et al. [25]
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could not conclude the attack with a key recovery even though much information
leaked about the secret. Frustratingly, a bruteforce phase to derive z from z̃ did not
lead to any security threat as stated in [25, Section 3]. They actually pointed out
an interesting open question of whether “novel lattice reduction algorithms [can]
take into account side-channel information”. Our work solves this open question by
combining the knowledge obtained in the divide-and-conquer template attack of [25]
with our framework.
From scores to hints. We first instantiate a DBDD instance with a chosen set of
parameters. Then we assume that, for each secret coefficient zi, we are given the
associated score table Si, thanks to the template attack that has already been car-
ried out. We go back to the a posteriori distribution in Equation 4.33 by applying
the exp() function and renormalizing the score table. As an example, we show the
probability distributions derived from Table 4.1, along with their variances and cen-
ters, in Table 4.2.
Finally, we use our framework to introduce n a posteriori approximate hints
to our DBDD instance with the derived centers and variances for each score table.
When the variance is exactly 0, we integrate perfect hints instead.
Results. One can reproduce this attack using the Sage 9.0 script
exploiting SCA from Bos et al.sage. The experimentally derived data containing the




−11 −10 −9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 0 0.04
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.56 0 0.21
. . . −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 . . . 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 . . . 0 0 0 0.95 0.04 0 0 0
−1 . . . 0.00 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 . . . 0.03 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 0
. . . 6 7 8 9 10 11 center variance
0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 . . . 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 1.05 0.06
−1 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.11 3.11
−1 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3.68 2.63
Table 4.2: Probability distributions derived from Table 4.1, along with variances
and centers.
generated with a simulated noise variance of 0.0045. One can note that the obtained
security fluctuates a bit from instance to instance, as it depends on the strength of
the hints, which themselves depend on the randomness of the scheme. In the first
two lines of Table 4.3, we show the new security with the inclusion of the approxi-
mate hints averaged on 50 tests per set of parameters.
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NIST1 NIST2 CCS1 CCS2 CCS3 CCS4
Attack without hints 487 708 239 448 492 584
Attack with hints 330 423 128 123 219 230
Attack with hints & guesses 292 298 70 29 124 129
Number of guesses g 100 250 200 300 250 250
Success probability 0.86 0.64 0.87 0.77 0.81 0.84
Table 4.3: Cost of the attacks in bikz without/with hints without/with guesses.
Guessing. To improve the attack further, one can note from Table 4.2 that certain
key values have a very high probability of being correct, and assuming each of these
values are correct, one can replace an approximate hint with a perfect one. For
example, considering the second line of Table 4.2, the secret has a probability of
0.95 to be 1 and thus guessing it trades a perfect hint for a decrease of the success
probability of the attack by 5%. This hybrid attack exploiting hints, guesses and
lattice reduction, works as follows. Let g be a parameter.
1. Include all the approximate and perfect hints given by the score tables,
2. Order the coefficients of the secret zi according to the maximum value of their
a posteriori distribution table,
3. Include perfect hints for the g first coefficients and then solve and check the
solution.
Increasing the number of guesses g leads to a trade-off between the cost of the attack
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and its success probability. We have chosen here a success probability larger than
0.6, while reducing the attack cost by 38 to 145 bikz depending on the parameter set.
Given that 1 bit of security corresponds roughly to 3 or 4 bikz, this is undoubtedly
advantageous.
Remark 4.19. The refinement presented above are very recent (lastly improved on
June 2020). We are grateful to the authors of [25] of for helping us reconstructing
distributions from the score table.
We remark that, with these results, the attacks with guesses on the parameters
CCS1 and CCS2 seem doable in practice while it was not the case with our original
results. However, some improvements of the implementation remain to be done in
order to actually mount the attack. The full-fledged implementation cannot handle
in reasonable time the large matrices of the original DBDD instance. We require
another class of implementation which fully maintains all information about the
instance, like the DBDD class, and assumes that the covariance matrix Σ is diagonal
to simplify the computations, like the DBDD predict diag class. We hope to report
on such an implementation in a future update of this report.
Remark 4.20. It should be noted that, given a single trace, one cannot naively
retry the attack to boost its success probability. Indeed, the “second-best” guess
may already have a much lower success probability than the first. Setting up such an
hybrid attack mixing lattice reduction within our framework and key-ranking appears
to be an interesting problem.
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4.3.2 Hints from decryption failures
Another kind of hint our framework can model are hints provided by decryp-
tion failures. For a single-bit LWE encryption scheme, a decryption failure occurs
when the random short vector w used during encryption is such that |〈s,w〉| ≥ t
for some t, typically t = q/4.
In fact, we can even assume to know the “side” of the decryption failure, i.e. we
can assume we know that 〈s,w〉 ≥ t. Indeed, this can be guessed with probability
1/2 for the first failure, and it can be deduced for subsequent failures using the
fact that those sides are strongly correlated (see Section 4.3 in [49] for example).
For multi-bit encryption, using either ring-element or matrices for secrets, similar
techniques allow to “locate” the failure, and therefore obtain information of this
form.
We will here consider the case of the Chosen-Ciphertext-Attack (CCA) secure
variant of such schemes, typically obtained by variants of the Fujikasi-Okamoto
transform. In this case, the attacker does not control the short vector w, as it is
generated following the randomness of a hash function.
Following our framework, it would be tempting to simply construct the con-
ditional distribution of 〈s,w〉 given that |〈s,w〉| ≥ t, and integrate this as an a
posteriori hint with v = w. However, this modeling would actually lose a lot of
information. Indeed, such hints are designed in the case where one first chooses w
independently of s, and then learns partial information on 〈s,w〉. The setting here
is quite different: one instead samples w following a prescribed distribution, until
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failure occurs. In other word, w is sampled on a prescribed distribution, and con-
ditioned on 〈s,w〉 ≥ t. In particular it is not sampled independently of the secret
s, and it carries information on s in all directions.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the norm of s is exactly ` =
√
nσ;
making such a guess is rather inconsequential given how concentrated the norm of
a high dimensional Gaussian is. Let us assume that w also follows a Gaussian of
covariance τ 2I, before imposing the condition. After conditioning, w decomposes as
w = αs/`+w′, where w′ is a Gaussian of covariance τ 2Π⊥s , and α is independent of
w′ and follows a distribution that we denote G
≥t/`
τ , the unidimensional Gaussian of
variance τ 2 conditioned on α ≥ t/`. One can check that the E
X←G≥t/`τ
[(t/`−X)2] ≤
τ 2 for any t/` ≥ 0. This means that we can write w = t/`2 · s + e for some error e
of (ill-centered) covariance Σe ≤ τI.
Rewriting the above equality, we finally obtain a full dimensional approximate





with an error e′ = − `2
t
e of (uncentered) covariance τ 2`4/t2 · I.
We can now compare the results of our prediction to prior work that used
several other methodologies such as [48,49,58,67]. We choose to compare with [49]
on FRODOKEM-976, for which the data can be reproduced3, and for which w is
indeed very close to Gaussian. We note that both methods use different simplications
or heuristics, nevertheless they produce essentially similar predictions, as shown
3https://github.com/KULeuven-COSIC/PQCRYPTO-decryption-failures/
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Figure 4.4: Security decrease as a function of the number of failure in FRODOKEM-
976.
in Figure 4.4. The data using our framework has been acquired with the script
exploiting decryption failures.sage.
Furthermore, one could try to refine the estimate of the average and variance
of e, which can improve in direction of w. However, this would force us to deal
with non-diagonal covariance matrices, which generically significantly slows down
our script, and would require further optimizations to be doable in practice. The
exploration of such improvements is left as future work.
4.3.3 Structural hints from Design
LAC is a Ring-LWE round two candidate of the NIST post-quantum compe-
tition [83]. The secrets are two polynomials s0, s1 (denoted s and e in the specifi-
cations) whose coefficients follow a distribution ψn,h, the uniform distribution over
ternary vectors {−1, 0, 1}n with exactly h/2 ones and h/2 minus ones. Thus, two
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LAC-128 LAC-192 LAC-256
without hints 509.03 985.64 1104.83
with 2 hints 505.94 982.74 1101.61
R5ND {1}KEM 0d R5ND {3}KEM 0d R5ND {5}KEM 0d
without hints 494.39 658.67 877.71
with 1 hint 492.94 657.23 876.24
ntruhps2048509 ntruhps2048677 ntruhps4096821
without hint 372.58 515.36 617.71
with 1 hint 371.23 513.95 616.39
with hint + 6 guesses 365.79 508.47 611.00
Table 4.4: New security estimates in bikz (GSA-Intersect method)
ntruhps2048509 ntruhps2048677 ntruhps4096821
without hints 379.61 526.17 631.84
with 1 hint 378.22 524.74 630.49
with hint + 6 guesses 372.64 519.11 624.94
with hint + multi-target 367.58 512.68 618.24
Table 4.5: New security estimates in bikz (Probabilistic-Simulation method)
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structural perfect hints can be derived:
n−1∑
i=0




The same structure appears in the submissions Round5, and NTRU-HPS, but yields
only one perfect hint on half of the secret as they also require the number of −1 coef-
ficients to be balanced with the number of 1 coefficients of their ternary polynomial.
In fact, exploiting this information was already mentionned in the cryptanalysis of
the original NTRU scheme [43]. While it is clear that each such equation it decreases
the dimension by 1, its effect on the volume of the lattice seems not to have been
analyzed so far; according to Lemma 4.10, the volume is increased by a factor
√
n.
This new knowledge has been included in the security analysis and the re-
sults are stored in Table 4.4. One can check the experiments by running the scripts
exploiting design LAC.sage, exploiting design round5.sage and exploiting design ntru.sage.
For Round5, we arbitrarily chose for our testing the parameter set R5ND {1, 3, 5}KEM 0d.
Remark 4.21. Note, however, that integrating such hints removes some q-vectors
from the lattice. For NTRU-HPS and Round5, there remain half of them, and this
is sufficient to find the optimal volume-dimension trade-off.4 For LAC, we note
that while q-vectors are not in the lattice, a difference of 2 such vectors is still in
it, for example the short vector hint (q,−q, 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Λ. We iteratively integrate
(q,−q, 0, 0, . . . , 0), (0, q,−q, 0, . . . , 0), (0, 0, q,−q, . . . , 0), . . . until such hints are not
worthy anymore, i.e. until such hints do not decrease the cost of the attack anymore.
4In a previous version of this paper, we treated NTRU-HPS and Round5 in the same way as
LAC, and used (q,−q)-vectors rather than q-vectors, which lead to a somewhat suboptimal attack.
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The case of NTRU. A first remark is that the NTRU problem is somewhat different
from the BDD problem, in the sense that it is homogenoues already: there is no need
to apply Kannan’s embedding to make it into a short vector problem. This means
in particular that the dimension of the input lattice is 2n and not 2n + 1. More
specifically, the secret consists of two ternary elements of the cyclic convolution ring
f, g ∈ Z[X]/(Xn − 1) =: R, and the public key h = f/g mod q. One can directly
construct the lattice Λ = {(x, y) ∈ R2 | x− hy = 0 mod q} and search for (f, g) as
a short vector in that lattice.
Secondly, the lattice enjoys a rotational symmetry of order n; in particular
there is not only a single short vector in that lattice, but n linearly independent
such short vectors: (f, g), (X · f,X · g), (X2 · f,X2g), . . . (Xn−1 · f,Xn−1 · g).5
A third remark is that, even without hints, and using the same GSA-interesect
method, our tool gives about 10 extra bikz of security to NTRU-HPS compared to
the analysis given in the standardization document [116]. The largest part of this
difference is to be accounted on the fact that [116] uses a lower-bound on the length
of one half of the secret. Such a simplification avoid the need for an isotropization
step, which would complicate an ad-hoc script, but is fully automatized by our tool.
One last remark is that [116] does also perform a dimension-reduction, but it is
not equivalent to the one discussed above. More specifically, they suggest to reduce
the problem modulo Φn where Φn = X
n−1 + Xn−2 + · · · + X + 1 denotes the n-th
cyclotomic polynomial for n a prime. Using the coefficient embedding to define the
5We remark that such a symmetries can also appear in Cyclotomic Ring-LWE, but at the cost
of increasing the lattice dimension from 2n+ 1 to 3n.
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geometry, this decreases dimension by 1, and leaves the volume unchanged; however
such a reduction can significantly increase the length of the secret vectors to be
found, when the leading coefficient of the secret polynomial (i.e. the last coefficient
of the secret vector) is not 0. Fortunately, because of the rotational symmetries,
there should some short vectors for which this reduction does not affect its length.6
A posteriori, this dimension reduction techniques essentially boils down to making
a guess fn = 0, knowing that this guess are likely satified by one of the many short
secrets; in our framework this is merely a perfect hint, and we predict, as in [116]
that it decreases dimension by one without affecting the volume.
These remarks suggests several refinements. The first is that we can combine
the integration of the hint
∑
fi = 0 and of a guess fn = 0. In fact, we can follow
the attack of May and Silverman [88], and integrate several such guesses so as to
fully exploit symmetries. Roughly, given that the secret are essentially uniform
and ternary, one can hope that one of the n short vectors will satisfy log3(n) ≈ 6
equations of the form fi = 0.
Yet, we can also wonder wether making such symmetry-breaking guesses is
really advantageous, as it could be that lattice reduction already internally benefits
from the presence of many short vectors. Under the GSA-interesect model, this does
not seem to be the case, as this model would predict that all the short vectors are
detected at the same time. However, the refined method of Section 4.2.5 can indeed
the account for the accumulated probability over multiple targeted short vectors.7
6We are greatful to John Schanck for this clarification.
7To apply the probabilistic-simulation for such large parameters, we only account for the prob-
ability of detecting the vector at position d−β, so as to avoid numerical issues raised by the rest of
this probability computation. However, the probability to be lifted back to the front once detected
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Our results are compiled in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, and the conclusion is,
according to the probabilistic simulation method, that it is seems preferable to not
make any guesses, and let lattice reduction naturally exploit the presence of many
short vectors. However, due to the other approximations made in [116], our refined
analysis does not invalidate the original security claims. We nevertheless think that
this revised analysis clarify the phenomena at play during lattice attacks on NTRU.
Remark 4.22. A similar structure is present in the candidate NTRU-Prime in its
streamlined and LPR versions [15]. In the secret vector, the number of ±1’s is fixed
to an integer w without knowing the exact number of positive and negative ones.
Thus, one can include a modular hint
n−1∑
i=0
s0[i] = w mod 2.
The loss of security is however essentially negligible.
at position d− β is very close to 1 for such a large β, as already argued in [7].
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Chapter 5: Towards a Ring Analogue of the Leftover Hash Lemma
The leftover hash lemma (LHL) is used in the analysis of various lattice-based
cryptosystems. Specifically, it is often useful to argue that for high-min entropy
input x ∈ Zmq and random matrix A ← Zn×mq , Ax is uniform random, given A.
The above fact is used in the proof of security for both the Regev and Dual-Regev
encryption schemes. More sophisticated proof approaches that utilize the LHL along
with the structure of the matrix A have been used to argue leakage resilience of these
cryptosystems, such as in [4, 53].
Analogues of the statement above do not necessarily hold in the ring setting:
The ring setting. Consider the number field K = Q[x]/Φm(x), where Φm(x) is
the m-th cyclotomic polynomial of degree ϕ(m). The ring of integers, R ⊂ K, is
defined as R = Z[x]/Φm(x). Rq := Zq[x]/Φm(x) denotes the set of polynomials
obtained by taking an element of Z[x]/Φm(x) and reducing each coefficient modulo
q. In this paper, we further assume that m is a power of two, so Φm(x) = x
n+ 1 has
degree n = m/2, and set q to be a prime such that q ≡ 1 mod m. In this case Φm(x)
completely splits into n factors in Zq[x]. This is the setting favored in practice since
0For example, techniques include decomposition of the matrix A into two random matrices of
varying dimensions [4].
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it allows for optimizations in the implementation, such as fast arithmetic over the
ring Rq.
A Ring Analogue of the LHL. For rings Rq such as the above, a result anal-
ogous to the leftover hash lemma—proving that al+1 =
∑
i∈[l] aixi is indistinguish-
able from random, given a2, . . . , al, as long as x1, . . . , xl has sufficiently high min-
entropy—is impossible. For example, if the j-th NTT coordinate of each ring ele-
ment in x = x1, . . . , xl is leaked, then the j-th NTT coordinate of al+1 =
∑
i∈[l] aixi
is known1, and so al+1 is very far from uniform. Yet this is only a 1/n leakage rate!
2
Nevertheless, Lyubashevsky et al. [85] proved a “regularity lemma” showing
that for matrix A = [Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l, where Ik ∈ (Rq)k×k is the identity matrix
and Ā ∈ (Rq)k×(l−k) is uniformly random, and x chosen from a discrete Gaussian
distribution (centered at 0) over Rlq, the distribution over Ax is (close to) uniform
random. A similar result was proven by Micciancio [90], but requires super-constant
dimension l, thus yielding non-compact cryptosystems. In contrast, the regularity
lemma of [85] holds even for constant dimension l as small as 2. The fundamental
technical question we consider in this work is:
For which distributions D over x ∈ Rlq, is the distribution over Ax (close
to) uniform random, for R, q, A as above and constant l?
1Applying NTT to ai, xi ∈ Rq—resulting in n-dimensional vectors, âi, x̂i ∈ Znq —allows for
component-wise multiplication/addition, so the j-th NTT coordinate of aixi, i ∈ [l] will be known
and so the j-th NTT coordinate of al+1 is known.
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this counterexample to us.
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5.1 Overview of Our Work
We prove a “regularity lemma” for three conditional distributions, which we
describe next. Only the parameter s–the standard deviation of the discrete Gaussian
for sampling each coordinate of x–differs in each setting.
Conditional Distribution I. We assume a secret key x = (x1, . . . , xl), where each
xi ∈ Rq. Moreover, each xi itself is represented as an n-dimensional vector. So in
total, x is an l ·n-dimensional vector. We consider the conditional distribution on x
when the sum of x and e is revealed, where each coordinate of e is a Gaussian random
variable with standard deviation at least s. This setting captures leakage on x by
an adversary who uses a fast, but inaccurate device to obtain noisy measurements of
each sampled coordinate of the secret key (e.g. through a power or timing channel).
We prove that it is sufficient to set s ≥
√
2 · 2n · qk/l+2/(nl). See Theorem 5.2 and
Corollary 5.3.
Conditional Distribution II. We consider the conditional distribution over x =
(x1, . . . , xl) when we leak ` coordinates from each xi, i ∈ [l]. and we set parameters
such that the fraction of leaked coordinates– `·l
n·l–is constant. The ` leaked coordi-
nates are arbitrary, but the same ` coordinates must be leaked from each xi, i ∈ [l].3
Low noise is added to each leaked coordinate (only 2n standard deviation, as op-
posed to
√
2 · 2n · qk/l+2/(nl) standard deviation as in Conditional Distribution I).
3Alternatively, we can view the leakage as ` completely arbitrary coordinates, with leakage rate
of `/(n · l), which remains constant for constant l.
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No information at all is leaked about the remaining coordinates. This setting cor-
responds to a side-channel attack launched during the sampling of x, where the
attacker has a slower, but more accurate device which allows it to obtain more ac-
curate measurements for a constant fraction of the coordinates of the secret key, but
no information for the remaining coordinates. 4 We prove that it is sufficient to set
s ≥ 2n · q
kn+2
l(n−`) , where ` · l is the number of leaked coordinates. See Theorem 5.4 and
Corollary 5.8.
Conditional Distribution III. Here, we consider the conditional distribution on x,
when the magnitude of x with Gaussian channel error e is revealed (note that e is a
scalar). We assume e is sampled from a univariate Gaussian with standard deviation
s. A motivation for this type of leakage is that (discrete) Gaussian sampling of x
is often implemented via rejection sampling in practice [28, 51]. E.g. a vector could
be sampled from a “close” multi-dimensional binomial distribution and rejection
sampling then used to obtain a sample from the correct distribution. The rejection
condition depends on the weight of x under the target distribution, which in turn
depends on the magnitude of x, and so this information is vulnerable to leakage
during computation. 5 We prove that it is sufficient to set s ≥
√
14/5 · (n′/n) · lnn′ ·
2n · qk/l+2/(nl), where n′ = n · l + 1. See Theorem 5.12 and Corollary 5.13.
4Here we assume that the secret key is stored as a vector in the canonical embedding (in the
other leakage scenarios, the result holds when the secret key is stored in using the polynomial
representation or is stored as a vector in the canonical embedding).
5For example, a power analysis attack on the BLISS signature scheme [60] exploited the rejection
sampling procedure to recover the magnitude (norm) of certain secret values, which then led to a
full break of the scheme.
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Applications to leakage resilience. Since applications of the LHL/Regularity Lemma
in lattice-based cryptography are widespread, a number of Ring-LWE (RLWE) cryp-
tosystems achieve certain leakage resilience properties using our results. Such cryp-
tosystems include the ring analogues of Regev encryption [84], Dual-Regev encryp-
tion [85], and identity-based encryption (IBE) based on Dual-Regev encryption [63]
(see ring version in [16]). Specifically, by substituting our “regularity lemma” for the
original “regularity lemma” in the security proofs, those schemes still enjoy security
guarantees even given certain leakage on the randomness for encryption (for Regev)
the secret key (for Dual-Regev), and the secret key corresponding to the challenge
identity (for IBE).
5.1.1 Our High-Level Approach
For a matrix A = [Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l, where Ik ∈ (Rq)k×k is the identity matrix
and Ā ∈ (Rq)k×(l−k) is uniformly random, we define Λ⊥(A) = {z ∈ Rl : Az =
0 mod qR}. If [x mod Λ⊥(A)] is uniform random (over cosets of Λ⊥(A)), then the
distribution of Ax is also uniform random over cosets of (qR)k. The input/output
distributions can then be discretized over the ring R. Therefore, the goal is to
show that when x is sampled from continuous distribution D, we have that [x
mod Λ⊥(A)] is uniform random. Consider the case where the distribution D is
exactly a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation s. In this case,
if s is greater than or equal to the smoothing parameter of Λ⊥(A), this by definition
ensures that the distribution [x mod Λ⊥(A)] is uniform random. Thus, [85] prove
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their regularity lemma by showing that with high probability over choice of A, the
smoothing parameter, ηε(Λ
⊥(A)), is upperbounded by s.
Before presenting our approach to extending the above result, it is instructive
to give a high-level recap of how to derive upper bounds on the smoothing parameter.
Let ρs := e
−π 〈x,x〉
s2 and let ψs (the normalization of ρs) correspond to the proba-
bility density function (PDF) of the normalized n-dimensional Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation s. In the following, for a function f we con-
cisely represent
∑
v∈Λ f(v) by f(Λ). To show that the distribution over [x mod Λ]
is (close to) uniform when x is sampled from a distribution with PDF ψs, one needs
to show that for every coset (Λ + c) of the lattice, ψs(Λ + c) ≈ 1det(Λ) . Focusing on
the zero coset, where c = 0, we can prove this using the Poisson summation formula,




where for a function f , f̂ denotes the n-dimensional Fourier transform of f and Λ∨
is the dual lattice of Λ (see Section 2.3.2). It remains to show that ψ̂s(Λ
∨) is close
to 1 (i.e. is upperbounded by 1 + ε).
The proof approach outlined above can be applied to (integrable) normalized
PDF Ψ that are not Gaussians centered at 0: To show that the distribution over [x
mod Λ] is (close to) uniform when x is sampled from a distribution with PDF Ψ, it
is sufficient to show that Ψ̂(Λ∨) is upperbounded by 1 + ε.
In this work, we consider PDF’s, Ψ, that correspond to the PDF of x, from
the point of view of the adversary, given the leakage. The technical contribution
of this work is to show that, for each conditional distribution, (with overwhelming
probability over choice of Ā) Ψ̂(Λ⊥(A)∨) is close to 1. Specifically, for each distribu-
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tion, our approach requires: (1) Determining the PDF Ψ, (2) Computing (an upper
bound for) the multi-dimensional Fourier transform of Ψ (denoted Ψ̂), (3) Proving
that Ψ̂((Λ⊥(A))∨) is upperbounded by 1+ε (or, equivalently that Ψ̂((Λ⊥(A))∨\{0})
is upperbounded by ε).
5.1.2 Related Work
Leakage-resilient cryptography. There is a significant body of work on leakage-
resilient cryptographic primitives, beginning with the work of Dziembowski and
Pietrzak [57] on leakage-resilient stream-ciphers. Other constructions include [4,26,
27, 54, 74, 74, 80, 80, 86, 93, 99]. With the exception of [4], most of these results con-
struct new cryptosystems from the bottom up. In our work, we consider whether
we can prove that an existing cryptosystem enjoys leakage resilience, without mod-
ification of the scheme.
Lattice-based & leakage-resilient cryptography. Goldwasser et al. [64] initiated the
study of leakage resilience of lattice based cryptosystems. This was followed by series
of works [4,53,55], all these papers however study leakage resilience of schemes based
on standard LWE problem in both symmetric as well as public key setting.
Robustness of Ring-LWE To the best of our knowledge the ePrint version [45] of
this work is the first effort to study the robustness of RLWE based cryptosystems
under leakage. Subsequent to the publishing of ePrint [47], interest has sparked in
analyzing the RLWE-based schemes and their leakage resilience. Albrecht et.al [6]
investigatedcold boot attack on RLWE based KEM schemes and compared the num-
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ber of operations required to mount the attack when secret is stored with different
encodings. Recently, Bolboceanu et.al [20] studied the hardness of RLWE problem
in cases where the secret is sampled from distributions other than uniform random
distribution over the ring. In [46] it is shown that under specific structured leakage
on the NTT encoding of secret key, it is possible to recover the entire secret key
given multiple RLWE samples and they implement the attack to recover the secret
in real world parameter settings.
Other variants of LHL Stehlé and Steinfeld [108] studied the leftover hash lemma
in the ring setting for power of 2 cyclotomics and Rosca et.al [104] generalized their
result to non-cyclotomic rings. However, both these results study the case where
input is sampled from discrete Gaussian distribution.
5.2 Extending the Regularity Lemma
Our results are applicable when R is the ring of integers in the mth cyclotomic
number field K of degree n, m = 2n is a power of 2 and prime q is s.t. q ≡ 1
mod m. We denote by Ik ∈ (Rq)k×k the identity matrix.
5.2.1 Conditional Distribution I
Recall that x = (x1, . . . , xl), where each coordinate of each xi ∈ Rq is sampled
from a discrete Gaussian with standard deviation s and each xi is represented as
a vector in either the polynomial or canonical basis.6 We assume leakage of all
6Either representation works since for power-of-two cyclotomics, spherical Gaussians in the
polynomial basis correspond to spherical Gaussians in the canonical basis.
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coordinates, with Gaussian noise of standard deviation v = τ · s added. It turns
out that this conditional distribution is fairly simple to handle since if X and Y
are independent Gaussian random variables, then the distribution of X conditioned
on X + Y is also a Gaussian that is not centered at 0. Fortunately, the regularity
lemma of [85] straightforwardly extends to Gaussians that are not centered at 0.
We discuss formal details next, however, we mainly view Conditional Distribution I
as a warm-up to the more difficult Conditional Distributions II and III.
We begin by defining some notation, which will be useful in all of the Con-
ditional Distributions when manipulating Gaussian-distributed random variables.
We write probability density function of random variable X at value x, sampled
from n-dimensional Gaussian distribution with each component of variable pairwise
independent, as











with mean u = (u1, . . . , un) and standard deviation s = (s1, . . . , sn). The probability
density function of Y at value y, sampled from n-dimensional Gaussian distribution
with each component of variable pairwise independent, can be written as











with mean µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) and standard deviation v = (v1, . . . , vn).
We now consider the distribution of X, conditioned on knowledge of X + Y .
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We proceed with the following straightforward lemma:
Lemma 5.1. Given two independent random variables X and Y . Suppose that the
distribution of X is a n-dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean u and standard
deviation s, each component of X pairwise independent, and the distribution of Y is
a n-dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation v, each
component of Y pairwise independent. Then the distribution of X conditioned on
X+Y is also a n-dimensional Gaussian distribution, where each component of X is




























Proof. We have FZ|A(Z = b) generically represent the probability density function
of random variable Z at value b, conditioned on event A.
We can then derive the density function of X given the value z = (z1, . . . , zn)
of X + Y by computing
FX|X+Y=z(X = x) =
ψs,u(X = x)ψv,µ(Y = y),∫
Rn























































Hence FX|X+Y=z(X = x) is also in the form of probability density function of
X on value x sampled n-dimensional Gaussian distribution, where each component

























Specifically, Lemma 5.1 shows that, conditioned on leakage, each coordinate
xi of the secret key is sampled from a multivariate Gaussian distribution ρσ,ci with











. The entire secret key is
then sampled from ρσ,c, where c = [c
i]i∈l. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2. For positive integers k ≤ l ≤ poly(n), let A = [Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l,
where Ā ∈ (Rq)k×(l−k) is uniformly random. Then for all σ ≥ 2n · qk/l+2/(nl) and





≤ 1 + 2−Ω(n),
except with probability at most 2−Ω(n) over choice of Ā.
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemma 2.27 and the regularity lemma from [85].
The following corollary follows from Lemmas 2.32 and 2.33 and Theorem 5.2.
Corollary 5.3. Let R, n, q, k, l, c, σ be as in Theorem 5.2. Assume that A =
[Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l is chosen as in Theorem 5.2. Then, with probability 1 − 2−Ω(n)
over the choice of Ā, the distribution of Ax ∈ Rkq , where x ∈ Rl is chosen from
DΛ,σ,c, the discrete Gaussian probability distribution over R
l with parameter σ and
center c, satisfies that the probability of each of the qnk possible outcomes is in the
interval (1 ± 2−Ω(n))q−nk (and in particular is within statistical distance 2−Ω(n) of
the uniform distribution over Rkq ).
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In particular, this means that the standard deviation used to sample x should




· 2n · qk/l+2/(nl). Setting τ = 1,
we obtain the parameters described in the introduction.
5.2.2 Conditional Distribution II
Recall that x = (x1, . . . , xl), where each xi ∈ Rq and each xi is represented as
a vector in the canonical embedding. We assume leakage of ` coordinates—with low
noise added—of each xi for i ∈ [l] and restrict the coordinates leaked across each xi
to be the same. Let S ⊆ [n], where |S| = ` denote the set of positions (from each xi)
that are leaked. Lemma 5.1 shows that, conditioned on leakage, each component





(resp. 0), and variance σ2j ≥ 4n2 (resp. σ2j = s2).
Theorem 5.4. For positive integers k ≤ l ≤ poly(n), let A = [Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l,
where Ā ∈ (Rq)k×(l−k) is uniformly random. Let σ := (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Rn>0 and
c := (c1, . . . , cln) ∈ Rln be vectors, where ` positions in σ are set to 2n, and all
others are set to s. Let k, l, ` be such that l− k − l · `/n > 0 and l− k − 1 ≥ 1, and






≤ 1 + 2−Ω(n) except with probability at most
2−Ω(n) over choice of Ā.
For proving Theorem 5.4, we begin with exposition on the forms of the Ideals
qR∨ ⊆ J ⊆ R∨ in power-of-two cyclotomics as well as some lemmas.
To generate the set T of ideals J such that qR∨ ⊆ J ⊆ R∨ we take each
ideal I s.t. qR ⊆ I ⊆ R and set J := qI∨. Recall from Fact 2.14 that 〈q〉 splits
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completely into n distinct ideals of norm q, i.e. qR = Πi∈[n]pi. Therefore, the set of
all ideals I such that qR ⊆ I ⊆ R, is exactly the set S := {Πi∈Spi | S ⊆ [n]}. Thus,
the number of ideals I such that qR ⊆ I ⊆ R (and hence also the number of ideals
J ∈ T ) is exactly 2n. Moreover, note that for each ideal J ∈ T ,
|J /qR∨| = |R/qJ ∨| = N(qJ ∨).
Thus, we see that for each J ∈ T, 1 ≤ |J /qR∨| ≤ qn.
Let T1 denote the set of ideals J ∈ T such that |J /qR∨| < 2n. Let T2 denote
the set of ideals J such that |J /qR∨| ≥ 2n. Furthermore, let T 12 be the set of
J ∈ T2 such that s ≥ η2−2n((1qJ )
∨) (where η2−2n denotes the smoothing parameter
and s is fixed as above). Let T 22 := T2 \ T 12 . Let σ := (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Rn>0 be a vector
with ` positions are set to 2n, while the other positions are set to value s.



































≤ (|J /qR∨| · nn)1/n (5.3)
≤ (2n · nn)1/n (5.4)
= 2n,
where (5.1) follows from Lemma 2.24, (5.2) follows from Lemma 2.12, and (5.3)







= |J /qR| = |R∨/R| · |J /qR∨| = ∆K |J /qR|
(for example, see [40, page. 63]), and (5.4) follows from the definition of T1.










where ρ1/σ1,...,1/σn is an n-dimensional Gaussian function with coordinate-wise stan-
dard deviation 1/σi, i ∈ [n] and center 0 (see beginning of Appendix 2.4.2).
Proof. Recall that σ := (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Rn>0 is defined as a vector such that ` positions
are set to 2n, while the other positions are set to s. Define z1, . . . , zn in the following




























































where (5.6) follows from definitions of ρ and zi. To derive (5.7), let us first
introduce the following claim.
Claim 5.7. For any lattice L∨,




Proof. It can be easily verified by combining Poisson Summation formula and the
fact that ρ̂s1,...,sn = s1 · · · snρ1/s1,...,1/sn .
By replacing si with 1/zi for all i and replacing L with
1
q
































By definition of zi,
zi
σi









, when σi = 2n. Since
there are ` positions in σ when σi = 2n, we obtain (5.7). Finally (5.8) follows by




Now, using the fact that η2−2n ≤ (∆K |J /qR∨|)1/n, the fact that ∆K = nn and









≤ |J /qR∨|−(l−k−l·`/n)(1 + 2−2n)l · 2−`·l
≤ 2−n(l−k)
which completes the proof of the lemma.
We now conclude the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Since by Lemma 2.27 we have that for any (n · l)-dimensional
vectors, c, x and any n-dimensional vector σ = (σ1, . . . , σn):
ρ̂σl,c (x) ≤ ρ̂σl (x) = ρ(1/σ1,...,1/σn)l (x) ,






















































≤ (1 + 2−2n)l.
On the other hand, by definition of T 22 , for ideals J ∈ T 22 , we have that


















· (1 + 2−2n). Since η2−2n((Jq )
∨)n ≤ |J /qR∨|∆K , and







(|J /qR∨|∆Ks−n+` · (2n)−`)l · (1 + 2−2n)l. Combining the above, we get that for







≤ max(1, (|J /qR∨|∆Ks−n+` · (2n)−`)l) · (1 + 2−2n)l.
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|J /qR∨|−(l−k) ·max(1, (|J /qR∨|∆Ks−n+` · (2n)−`)l) · (1 + ε)l


















≤ 2n · 2−n(l−k) ∈ 2−Ω(n),
where the last line follows from the setting of parameters in Theorem 5.4.
This completes the proof.
The following corollary follows from Lemmas 2.32 and 2.33 and Theorem 5.4.
Corollary 5.8. Let k, l, `, σ and c be as in Theorem 5.4. Assume that A = [Ik|Ā] ∈
(Rq)
k×l is chosen as in Theorem 5.4. Then, with probability 1 − 2−Ω(n) over the
choice of Ā, the distribution of Ax ∈ Rkq , where x ∈ Rl is chosen from DRl,σl,c, the
discrete Gaussian probability distribution over Rl with parameter σl and center c,
satisfies that the probability of each of the qnk possible outcomes is in the interval
(1±2−Ω(n))q−nk (and in particular is within statistical distance 2−Ω(n) of the uniform
distribution over Rkq ).
126
In particular, this means that the standard deviation used to sample x should
be increased from 2n · qk/l+2/(nl) (as in [85]) to 2n · q
kn+2
l(n−`) .
5.2.3 Conditional Distribution III
We slightly change the dimensions so that x is represented by a vector of
dimension n′ := l · n + 1. When n is a power of two, a spherical Gaussian in the
coefficient representation is also a spherical Gaussian in the canonical embedding
representation [84]. So we can assume that x is generated using the coefficient
representation, where each coordinate is sampled independently from a discrete
Gaussian, DZ,s′ . During sampling of x, an additional coordinate is sampled and
stored together with the remainder of the secret.











where u is mean, and s is standard deviation of the distribution. We write prob-
ability density function of secret key X at value x = (x1, . . . , xn′), of which each
coordinate is independently sampled from a Gaussian distribution with center at 0
and standard deviation s, as


















= ψs(‖X‖ = r),
where r is the magnitude of x. It also can be viewed as probability density function
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of secret key for its magnitude ‖X‖ = r, denoted as ψs(‖X‖ = r). The error is
sampled from a 1-dimensional Gaussian distribution with center at 0. We write
probability density function of error E at value y is









Let FZ|A(f(Z) = b) generically represent the probability density function of
random variable Z at value b of f(Z), conditioned on event A.
We now derive the density function of secret key X given the value z of |‖X‖+
E|. The weight placed on a value x = (x1, . . . , xn′) by the conditional distribution
depends only on the magnitude of x (i.e. r = ‖x‖) and can be computed as:
F
X
∣∣|‖X‖+E|=z(‖X‖ = r) = FX,E(‖X‖ = r, ‖X‖+ E| = z)FX,E(‖X‖+ E| = z)
=
ψs(‖X‖ = r)ψv(E = z − r) + ψs(‖X‖ = r)ψv(E = −z − r)
FX,E(‖X‖+ E = z) + FX,E(‖X‖+ E = −z)
=
ψs(‖X‖ = r)ψv(E = z − r) + ψs(‖X‖ = r)ψv(E = −z − r)∫
Rn′






























































where N is the normalization factor.
F
X
∣∣|‖X‖+E|=z(‖X‖ = r) is the sum of two Gaussian functions centered at zs2v2+s2
and − zs2
v2+s2
respectively with the same standard deviation σ. Suppose v = s, we




Lemma 5.9. Suppose v = s, we bound the center zs
2
v2+s2









∈ 2−Ω(n), where the probability is taken over choice of x and e.
We first present the following lemma, and then use it to prove Lemma 5.9.









, Y is upper bounded by v
√
n′ except for negligible probabil-
















By using Chernoff bound and calculating exponential moment of standard normal
distribution, we have, for any λ > 0.



















≤ e−x2/2 = e−πn′ . The lemma
follows.














































Note that since s > n, and using the fact that λ1((R

















(See Lemma 2.12), by Lemma 2.24,
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we ensure s > η2−n(R










Let Ψσ,c(x) := F
X





σ2 . By Lemma 5.9, we have that with all but negligible








For the proof, we will require certain properties of the Fourier transform of
Ψσ,c, when c is bounded as above. We state those properties in the following theorem,
which is proved in Appendix A2.1.
Theorem 5.11. Let n′ := l · 2a + 1, where l, a are positive integers and a > 2,
and c ≤
√
2 · σ ·
√
n′. Let Ψσ,c denote the normalized pdf corresponding to the non-




σ2 , where x is a vector over n′
dimensions. and let Ψ̂σ,c(y) denote the n
′-dimensional Fourier transform of Ψσ,c.
Then |Ψ̂σ,c(y)| ≤ n′n
′
· e−π‖y‖2σ2 for ‖y‖ > 1/σ.
We next present the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.12. For positive integers k ≤ l ≤ poly(n), let A = [Ik|Ā] ∈ (Rq)k×l,









lnn′ · 2n · qk/l+2/(nl). Define Λ⊥(A)+ as a direct product of Λ⊥(A) and Z,







except with probability at most 2−Ω(n).
Proof. Note that Λ⊥(A) is a lattice of even dimension l · n (where n is a power of
two), but Theorem 5.11 holds only for n′ equal to l · 2a + 1. Therefore, we define
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n′ := l · n + 1, and we have the n′-dimensional lattice Λ⊥(A)+ := Λ⊥(A) × Z. We
have the following properties of Λ⊥(A)+, which can be verified by inspection:
(a) (Λ⊥(A)+)∨ := Λ⊥(A)∨ × Z;
(b) the shortest non-zero vector in (Λ⊥(A)+)∨ is at least min(λ1(Λ
⊥(A)∨), 1), where
λ1(Λ
⊥(A)∨) denotes the shortest non-zero vector in Λ⊥(A)∨;
By Poisson summation formula, it is sufficient to show that with probability
1 − 2−Ω(n) over choice of A, |Ψ̂σ,c|(Λ⊥(A)+)∨) ≤ 1 + 2−Ω(n), where Ψ̂σ,c denotes
the Fourier transform of Ψσ,c over n
′ dimensions and the notation |Ψ̂σ,c| means the
summation of the absolute value of the function over the lattice Λ⊥(A)+)∨.
We first note that, over n′ dimensions, Ψ̂σ,c(0) = 1. This follows due to the
fact that by definition of Fourier transform, Ψ̂σ,c(0) :=
∫
Rn′ Ψσ,c(x) dx. Since Ψσ,c is
a normalized PDF, it must be the case that
∫
Rn′ Ψσ,c(x) dx = 1.
Thus, it remains to show that
∣∣∣Ψ̂σ,c∣∣∣ ((Λ⊥(A)+)∨ \ {0}) ≤ 2−Ω(n).
Towards showing this, we first let β = 2n · qk/l+2/(nl) for simplicity, and then







· e−(σ2·π·κ2) ≤ n′n
′
· e−5(σ2·π·κ2)/7 · e−2(σ2·π·κ2)/7 ≤ e−2(σ2·π·κ2)/7,









lnn′ · β is












−2(σ2·π·κ2)/7. Combining the above inequalities




, together with (b) and Corollary 2.37, which states
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that with probability 1 − 2−Ω(n) over choice of A, the shortest non-zero vector in




, we conclude that an upper bound on Q yields an
upper bound on the desired quantity,
∣∣∣Ψ̂σ,c∣∣∣ ((Λ⊥(A)+)∨ \ {0}).







2·π·κ2)/7 · e−(σ2·π·κ2)/7 ≤ e−1/5·n′ lnn′ · e−(σ2·π·κ2)/7, (5.12)
























′ lnn′ · e−(σ2·π·κ2)/7






′ lnn′ · 2n′(1 +Q),
where the first inequality follows from (5.12) and the definition of Q, the second
inequality from (5.13), and the final equality from the definition of Q.
Thus we have that (1− e−1/5·n′ lnn′ · 2n′)Q ≤ e−1/5·n′ lnn′ · 2n′ which implies that
Q ≤ 2 · e−1/5n′ lnn′ · 2n′ ≤ 2−n′+1 ≤ 2−Ω(n), assuming n′ is at least 210.
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Corollary 5.13. Let k, l, σ and c be as in Theorem 5.12. Assume that A = [Ik|Ā] ∈
(Rq)
k×l is chosen as in Theorem 5.12. Then, with probability 1 − 2−Ω(n) over the
choice of Ā, the distribution of Ax ∈ Rkq , where (x, xn′) ∈ Rl × Z is chosen from
DRl×Z,Ψσ,c satisfies that the probability of each of the q
nk possible outcomes is in the
interval (1 ± 2−Ω(n))q−nk (and in particular is within statistical distance 2−Ω(n) of
the uniform distribution over Rkq ).
Proof. Ψσ,c
(
Λ⊥(A)+ + (b, b′)
)
∈ det((Λ⊥(A)+)∨)(1± 2−Ω(n)), which means that if
we choose a n′-dimensional vector from distribution DRl×Z,Ψσ,c , written as x
′ =
(x, xn′), and let (b, bn′) = x
′ mod (Λ⊥(A)+), then the resulting distribution is
within statistical distance 2−Ω(n) to uniform distribution over (Rl × Z) modulo
(Λ⊥(A)+). Due to the structure of Λ⊥(A)+, this also implies that the marginal
distribution over b is uniform over (Rl) modulo (Λ⊥(A)). Moreover, we can easily
see that for x′ = (x, xn′), if x
′ mod (Λ⊥(A)+) = (b, bn′), then Ax = Ab. Finally,
since when b is uniform random over Rl modulo Λ⊥(A), we have that Ab is uniform
random over Rkq , the corollary follows.
Given the corollary, the analysis of Conditional Distribution III is complete.
In particular, this means that the standard deviation used to sample x should be
increased from 2n · qk/l+2/(nl) (as in [85]) to
√
14/5 · n′/n · lnn′ · 2n · qk/l+2/(nl).
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A1: Appendix of Learning with Errors with Side Information
A1.1 Refined prediction via BKZ-simulation and a probabilistic
model
The work of [7] warns about a regime where those predictions are not accurate,
due to a so-called second-intersection between the predicted lengths of the Gram-
Schmidt vectors and the successive projections of the secret. This phenomenon
only appears for small blocksizes β, which is not relevant for cryptographically hard
instances. However, we would still like to be able to make reliable predictions for
small blocksizes as well, so as to test the validity of our predictions with and without
hints.
Other sources of inaccuracy of this model are the so-called head and tails
phenomenon [11, 114], as well as the fact that one can be lucky: the projected
length of the secret can vary, making it plausible that the secret will be found with
a slightly smaller blocksize. For example, in [7] more than 50% of the attacks were
already successful by running BKZ with blocksize βpred − 5.
Furthermore, the predictions of [7] work under the assumption that as soon as
the projected secret vector has been detected at position d − β, it will be “pulled-
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back” to the front by the run of LLL that is typically executed between BKZ tours.
For large block-sizes β this event is indeed very likely as argued and experimentally
verified in [7], but may not occur in small or intermediate dimension. In fact, the
issue of double-intersection is precisely related to this assumption.
For experimental validation purposes of our work, we prefer to have accurate
prediction even for small blocksizes. We therefore devise a refined strategy. First,
we resort to the so called BKZ-simulator [38] to predict more accurately the length
`i of the Gram-Schmidt vectors. Secondly, we do not assume that the projected
secret πi(s) (projected orthogonally to the i− 1 first vectors of the reduced basis, as
in [7]) has exactly length
√
n− i, but simply treat it as a spherical Gaussian. We
can therefore compute the probability that it is detected at position i by considering
the CDF of χ2n−i, the chi-square distribution with n− i degrees of freedom.
At last, we do not only account for the detectability of the secret vector at
position i = n− β, but also check whether it is likely that the vector will be pulled
to the front (not by the interleaved LLL, by BKZ itself, which is more powerful).
That is, we consider the probability that:
Ei : ‖πi(s)‖ ≤ `i simultaneously for all i ∈ {d− β, d− 2β + 1, d− 3β + 2, . . . }.
Those events are not perfectly independent, which makes computing the prob-
ability of the conjunction of those more painful.1 For simplicity, we only account
for dependence between consecutive events Ei and Ei+1 and therefore avoid having
1The expert reader may note that, for s uniformly distributed over a sphere, such conjunction
correspond to a cylinder interesection, as used for pruning in enumeration [61].
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GSA-Intersect method [7, 9]
Probabilistic-simulation method
Figure A1.1: The difference ∆β = real − predicted, as a function of the average
experimental beta β. The experiment consists in running a single tour of BKZ-β
for β = 2, 3, 4, . . . until the secret short vector is found. This was averaged over
256 many LWE instances per data-point, for parameters q = 3301, σ = 20 and
n = m ∈ {30, 32, 34, . . . , 88}.
to resort to numerical computation of nested integrals. We iteratively compute the
success probability for each tour of BKZ-β for increasing β, and from there deduce
the average successful β.
As depicted in Figure A1.1, this methodology (coined Probabilistic-simulation)
leads to much more satisfactory estimates compared to the model from the litera-
ture [7, 9]. In particular, for low blocksize the literature widely underestimates the
required blocksize, which is due to only considering detectability at position d− β.
For large blocksize, it somewhat overestimates it, which could be attributed to the
fact that it does not account for luck. On the contrary, our new methodology seems
quite precise in all regimes, making errors of at most 1 bikz. This new methodology
certainly deserves further study and refinement, which we leave to future work.
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A1.2 Implementation
A1.2.1 Our Sage implementation
We propose three implementations of our framework, all following the same
python/sage 9.0 API.2 More specifically, the API and some common functions are
defined in DBDD generic.sage, as a class DBDD Generic. Three derived classes are
then given:
1. The class DBDD (provided in DBDD.sage) is the full-fledged implementation:
i.e. it fully maintains all information about a DBDD instance as one integrates
hints: the lattice Λ, the covariance matrix Σ and the average µ. While poly-
nomial time, maintaining the lattice information can be quite slow, especially
since consecutive intersections with hyperplanes can lead to manipulations on
rationals with large denominators. It also allows to finalize the attack, run-
ning the homogenization, isotropization and lattice reduction, based on the
fplll [50] library available through sage.
We note that if one were to repeatedly use perfect or modular hints, a lot of
effort would be spent on uselessly alternating between the primal and the dual
lattice. Instead, we implement a caching mechanism for the primal and dual
basis, and only update them when necessary.
2. The class DBDD predict (provided in DBDD predict.sage) is the lightweight
2While we would have preferred a full python implementation, we are making a heavy use of
linear algebra over the rationals for which we could find no convenient python library.
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implementation: it only fully maintains the covariance information, and the
parameters of the lattice (dimension, volume). It must therefore work under
assumptions about the primitivity of the vector v; in particular, it cannot
detect hints that are redundant. If one must resort to this faster variant on
large instances, it is advised to consider potential (even partial) redundancy
between the given hints, and to run a comparison with the previous on small
instances with similarly generated hints.
3. The class DBDD predict diag (provided in DBDD predict diag.sage) is the
super-lightweight implementation. It maintains the same information as the
above, but requires the covariance matrix to remain diagonal at all times. In
particular, one can only integrate hints for which the directional vector v is
colinear with a canonical vector.
A1.2.2 Tests and validation
We implement two tests to verify the correctness of our scripts, and more
generally the validity of our predictions.
Consistency checks. Our first test (check consistency.sage) simply verifies that all
three classes always agree perfectly. More specifically we run all three versions on a
given instances, integrating the same random hint in all of them, and compare their
hardness prediction. We first test using the full-fledged version that the primitivity
condition does hold, and discard the hint if not, as we know that predictions cannot
be correct on such hints. This verification passes.
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Prediction verifications. We now verify experimentally the prediction made by our
tool for various types of hints, by comparing those predictions to actual attack
experiments (see compare usvp models.sage for the prediction without hints and pre-
diction verifications.sage for the prediction with hints). This is done for a given set of
LWE parameters, and increasing the number of hints. The details of the experiments
and the results are given in Figure A1.2.
While our predictions seem overall accurate, we still note a minor discrepancy
of up to 2 or 3 bikz in the low blocksize regime. This exceeds the error made by
prediction on the attack without any hint, which was below 1 bikz, even in the same
low blocksize regime. We suspected that this discrepancy is due to residual q-vectors,
or small combinations of them, that are hard to predict for randomly generated
hints, but would still benefit by lattice reduction. We tested that hypothesis by
running similar experiments, but leaving certain coordinates untouched by hints, so
to still explicitly know some q-vectors for short-vector hint integration, if they are
“worthy”. This didn’t to improve the accuracy of our prediction, which infirms our
suspected explanation. We are at the moment unable to explain this innacuracy. We
nevertheless find our predictions satisfactory, considering that even without hints,
previous predictions [7] were much less accurate (see Figure A1.1).
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n = m = 70, q = 3301, σ = 20
n = m = 80, q = 3301, σ = 20
Hint Type Parameter
Perfect hints –
Modular hints mod 11
Approximate hints σ2ε = 3
The hint vectors v were chosen as
random ternary vectors of weight 5.
Figure A1.2: Experimental verification of the security decay predictions for each
type of hints. Each data point was averaged over 256 samples.
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A2: Appendix of Towards a Ring Analogue of the Leftover Hash
Lemma
A2.1 Proof of Theorem 5.11
In this section, we prove the following theorem, which provides an upper bound
on the Fourier transform of a pdf for the analysis of Conditional Distribution III in
Section 5.2.3.
Theorem 5.11. Let n′ := l · 2a + 1, where l, a are positive integers and a > 2,




n′. Let Ψσ,c denote the normalized pdf corresponding to the non-




σ2 , where x is a vector over n′
dimensions. and let Ψ̂σ,c(y) denote the n
′-dimensional Fourier transform of Ψσ,c.
Then |Ψ̂σ,c(y)| ≤ n′n
′
· e−π‖y‖2σ2 for ‖y‖ > 1/σ.
The following lemma computes a lower bound of the normalization factor of
the pdf in Theorem 5.11. Once we prove the lemma, we proceed to the proof of
Theorem 5.11.







σ2 dx ≥ σn′ .
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σ2 . Let r = ‖x‖. Since f is a radial function,













where Vn′ denotes the volume of n




. Since f is an
even function and n′ is odd, so rn
′−1 is an even function, we have that rn
′−1f(r) is
even and so ∫ ∞
0
rn



























































































Combining the above with (A2.1) and (A2.2) and substituting for a, we get that∫
Rn′
f(x) dx ≥ σn′ , which completes the proof of the lemma.
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Proof of Theorem 5.11. Let N be the normalization of f(x) over n′ dimensions. We
have from Lemma A2.1 that N ≥ σn′ Thus, it remains to show that for n′ := l ·2a+1




n′, f̂(y) ≤ σn′ · n′5/4 · e−π‖y‖2σ2 .





σ2 . Since Ψσ,c is a radial function, so is its Fourier transform, thus,
we again slightly abuse notation and view F := f̂ as a function of κ := ‖y‖. We may
now use the formula for the radial Fourier transform of an n′-dimensional, radial
function f to find F [65]:























Γ(ν + j + 1)j!
. (A2.4)
For half-integer order ν := n + 1
2
, there is a closed-form representation of Jν .
Specifically, it can be expressed as [112, Page 298]:
Jn+ 1
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where the first equality follows from (A2.3), the second equality follows


































































































































































































(ei2πκr + e−i2πκr) dr
∣∣∣∣∣ , (A2.8)
where the second equality follows since f(r) is an even function, cos(2πκr) is an
even function and for n′ = l · 2a + 1, all powers of r in the integrand are even, which
means that the entire integrand is an even function.











(ei2πκr + e−i2πκr) dr
∣∣∣∣ (A2.9)
as above, we integrate each term separately. Since the analysis is essentially the same
for each term, we focus on upper bounding the term A :=
∣∣∣∣∫∞−∞ e−π(r−c)2σ2 ei2πκr dr∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣e−πκ2σ2+2πiκc ∫∞−∞ e−πσ−2(r−(c+iκσ2))2 dr∣∣∣:
145
A =
































































































































































































































≤ 2n and n! ≤ nn. We now turn to
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(ei2πκr − e−i2πκr) dr
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
(A2.10)
where the second equality follows since f(r) is an even function, sin(2πκr) is
an odd function and for n′ = l · 2a + 1, all powers of r in the integrand are odd,
which means that the entire integrand is an even function.











(ei2πκr − e−i2πκr) dr (A2.11)
as above, we integrate each term separately. Since the analysis is essentially
the same for each term, we focus on the term B :=
∣∣∣∣∫∞−∞ e−π(r−c)2σ2 ei2πκr dr∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣e−πκ2σ2+i2πκc ∫∞−∞ e−πσ−2(r−(c+iκσ2))2 dr∣∣∣:
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B =





















































































































































































































≤ 2n and n! ≤ nn. Finally, plugging
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n′ and κ > 1
σ
, we obtain:
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[56] Léo Ducas, Alain Durmus, Tancrède Lepoint, and Vadim Lyubashevsky. Lat-
tice signatures and bimodal gaussians. In Annual Cryptology Conference,
pages 40–56. Springer, 2013.
[57] Stefan Dziembowski and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Leakage-resilient cryptography.
In 49th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 293–
302, Philadelphia, PA, USA, October 25–28, 2008. IEEE Computer Society
Press.
[58] Jan-Pieter D’Anvers, Qian Guo, Thomas Johansson, Alexander Nilsson, Fred-
erik Vercauteren, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. Decryption failure attacks on IND-
CCA secure lattice-based schemes. In IACR International Workshop on Public
Key Cryptography, pages 565–598. Springer, 2019.
[59] Wolfgang Ebeling. Lattices and codes. In Lattices and Codes, pages 1–32.
Springer, 2013.
[60] Thomas Espitau, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benoit Gerard, and Mehdi Tibouchi.
Side-channel attacks on BLISS lattice-based signatures – exploiting branch
tracing against strongSwan and electromagnetic emanations in microcon-
trollers. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/505, 2017. http://eprint.
iacr.org/2017/505.
[61] Nicolas Gama, Phong Q Nguyen, and Oded Regev. Lattice enumeration using
extreme pruning. In Annual International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 257–278. Springer, 2010.
[62] Oscar Garcia-Morchon, Zhenfei Zhang, Sauvik Bhattacharya, Ronald Riet-
man, Ludo Tolhuizen, Jose-Luis Torre-Arce, Hayo Baan, Markku-Juhani O.
Saarinen, Scott Fluhrer, Thijs Laarhoven, and Rachel Player. Round5. Tech-
nical report, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019. avail-
able at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/
round-2-submissions.
[63] Craig Gentry, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Trapdoors for hard
lattices and new cryptographic constructions. In Richard E. Ladner and Cyn-
thia Dwork, editors, 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pages 197–206, Victoria, BC, Canada, May 17–20, 2008. ACM Press.
[64] Shafi Goldwasser, Yael Tauman Kalai, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikun-
tanathan. Robustness of the learning with errors assumption. In Andrew
Chi-Chih Yao, editor, ICS 2010: 1st Innovations in Computer Science, pages
230–240, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, January 5–7, 2010. Tsinghua
University Press.
[65] Loukas Grafakos and Gerald Teschl. On fourier transforms of radial functions
and distributions. Journal of Fourier Analysis and Applications, 19(1):167–
179, Feb 2013.
156
[66] Leon Groot Bruinderink and Peter Pessl. Differential fault attacks on deter-
ministic lattice signatures. In IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems, volume 2018, pages 21–43, Aug. 2018.
[67] Qian Guo, Thomas Johansson, and Alexander Nilsson. A generic attack on
lattice-based schemes using decryption errors. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2019/043, 2019.
[68] Wassily Hoeffding. Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random vari-
ables. Journal of the American statistical association, 58(301):13–30, 1963.
[69] Jeff Hoffstein, Nick Howgrave-Graham, Jill Pipher, and William Whyte. Prac-
tical lattice-based cryptography: NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign. In The LLL
Algorithm, pages 349–390. Springer, 2009.
[70] Nick Howgrave-Graham. A hybrid lattice-reduction and meet-in-the-middle
attack against NTRU. In Alfred Menezes, editor, Advances in Cryptology
– CRYPTO 2007, volume 4622 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
150–169, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19–23, 2007. Springer, Heidelberg,
Germany.
[71] I. Ingemarsson, D. Tang, and C. Wong. A conference key distribution system.
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor., 28(5):714–720, September 1982.
[72] Ravi Kannan. Minkowski’s convex body theorem and integer programming.
In Mathematics of operations research, volume 12, pages 415–440. INFORMS,
1987.
[73] Jonathan Katz and Ji Sun Shin. Modeling insider attacks on group key-
exchange protocols. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS ’05, pages 180–189, New York, NY, USA,
2005. ACM.
[74] Jonathan Katz and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Signature schemes with bounded
leakage resilience. In Mitsuru Matsui, editor, Advances in Cryptology – ASI-
ACRYPT 2009, volume 5912 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
703–720, Tokyo, Japan, December 6–10, 2009. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[75] Jonathan Katz and Moti Yung. Scalable protocols for authenticated group key
exchange. In Dan Boneh, editor, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2003,
volume 2729 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 110–125, Santa
Barbara, CA, USA, August 17–21, 2003. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
[76] Jonathan Katz and Moti Yung. Scalable protocols for authenticated group
key exchange. Journal of Cryptology, 20(1):85–113, January 2007.
[77] Leonid Khachiyan. On the complexity of approximating extremal determi-
nants in matrices. volume 11, pages 138–153. Elsevier, 1995.
157
[78] Yongdae Kim, Adrian Perrig, and Gene Tsudik. Simple and fault-tolerant key
agreement for dynamic collaborative groups. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’00, pages 235–
244, New York, NY, USA, 2000.
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